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EXPERT WITNESS REPORTS IN FEDERAL CIVIL
LITIGATION: THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY IN
THE EXPERT WITNESS REPORT'S PREPARATION
Arthur F. Greenbaum*
Every day across America, civil litigators in federal court work
closely with experts to create requiredexpert reports and hone expert
testimony. Yet they do so without clear guidance as to the limits, if any,
on their assistance. Despite an attempt in 2010 to clarify the rules in this
area with amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that
attempt has proven woefully inadequate. Today there is no consensus as
to the line between proper assistance and lawyer overreaching. There
are major areas of uncertainty over the means by which the degree of
lawyer involvement can be discovered. While there is substantial
agreement that lawyer assistance at times is so excessive that exclusion
of the expert's report is warranted, or at least that that involvement is
relevant to the weight to be afforded the expert's testimony, some courts
so limit the inquiry into the lawyer's role in assisting the expert that
applying these safeguards is near impossible. In this Article, I unpack
the current doctrine laying bare the areas of disagreement. At a
minimum, this arms litigants with competing arguments to assert when
discovery disputes in this area arise. With the disagreements clearly
identified, courts may yet come to a consensus on these issues, although
the experience of the last eight years under the 2010 regime suggests
that hope is a remote one. Assuming some courts will continue to
frustrate attempts to uncover the extent of lawyer influence under the
current rules, Ipropose a variety of alternatives that can check excessive
lawyer involvement without creating the problems the 2010 amendments
were intended to address.
* James W. Shocknessy Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz
College of Law. I wish to thank my research assistants Christopher Batts, Nicholas Santos, Chip
Cooper, Matthew Stevens, and Brianna Soltys for their work on this project. I would also like to
thank Ric Simmons, Dan Tokaji, and Chris Walker for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Finally, I want to thank the Moritz College of Law for its financial support through its summer
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INTRODUCTION

Experts play a crucial role in modem litigation.' The range of cases
in which expert testimony is allowed, or in some cases required, is
immense. 2 It is the testimony of these experts that often make or break
a case. 3

In federal litigation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B)
requires that testifying experts' prepare and sign a written report as part
of required pretrial disclosures.' The role of the report is to facilitate
discovery of the opinions the expert may offer at trial. It "exposes the
thought process and method of the expert in advance of oral
examination. Its discipline both reduces the incentives of witnesses to

1. Stephen D. Easton, Ammunition for the Shoot-Out with the Hired Gun's Hired Gun: A
ProposalforFullExpert Witness Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 465, 471 (2000) (noting that experts
are "often the most important witness in civil cases"); Paul M. Mannix, Control of Work Product:
Avoiding Harmful Expert Disclosures, 46 DRI FOR THE DEF. 30 (2004) ("The expert witness has
become a fixture in modem civil litigation. Most cases involve at least some expert testimony, and
generally, both the plaintiff and the defendant present an expert with an opinion favorable to their
respective positions. The expert typically speaks to the crucial issues in the case and, as the expert is
offered as a witness with special knowledge in the critical field, the expert's testimony is often
given great weight. As a result, the outcome of the case frequently depends on which side wins the
'battle of the experts.' Thus, one of the most important tasks in preparing a case for trial is to retain,
prepare, and present the most competent, persuasive, and credible expert witness possible."); David
Sonenshein & Charles Fitzpatrick, The Problem of PartisanExperts and the Potentialfor Reform
Through Concurrent Evidence, 32 REv. LITIG. 1, 3 (2013) ("As the system has become inundated
with more complex litigation and cases of a more technical nature, the use of expert witnesses has
increased."); William R. Stuart I, Reconciling a Tense Coexistence: Can Federal Rule 26 Both
Prohibit Ghost-Writing and Protect Expert-Related Work Product?, 57 DRI FOR THE DEF. 20
(2015) (finding that "[e]xpert witnesses are integral to defending product liability lawsuits, and
[that] it is not uncommon for a case to rise or fall on the testimony of a single expert.").
2.

See supranote 1. See generally JAMES J. MANGRAVITI ET AL., How TO WRITE AN EXPERT

WITNESS REPORT app. D (2014) (providing model expert reports for numerous different
disciplines).
3. See supra note 1.
4. These are defined as a witness "retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert
testimony." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
5. The rule requires that the report include:
(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and
reasons for them;
(ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;
(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;
(iv) the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the
previous 10 years;
(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, thewitness testified as
an expert at trial or by deposition; and
(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case.
Id.
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present preliminary or tentative views and to tailor their opinion to an
advocate's case." 6
The drafters of the rule recognized that even though the report is to
be "prepared" by the expert, the expert could be assisted by a lawyer in
this endeavor. As the 1993 Advisory Committee Note to the Federal
Rule makes clear:
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) does not preclude counsel from providing assistance
to experts in preparing the reports, and indeed, with experts such as
automobile mechanics, this assistance may be needed. Nevertheless,
the report, which is intended to set forth the substance of the direct
examination, should be written in a manner that reflects the testimony
7
to be given by the witness and it must be signed by the witness.

Numerous cases have grappled with the question of how much a
lawyer may assist an expert in preparing the expert's report.' At some
point the degree of involvement is so great that the report ceases to be
one "prepared" by the expert, as the rule requires, but instead is really
the work of the lawyer. In such cases the expert is seen as a mere
"puppet" 9 or "avatar"o of the lawyer rather than as a testifying expert
providing independent, expert analysis. Even if the lawyer's assistance
does not supplant the work of the expert, its existence may still
compromise the independent analysis of the expert. The line between
permissible and impermissible assistance, however, remains unclear."
12
Part II of this Article addresses this issue.
6.

6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

26.23[5]

(3d ed. 2000).
7. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
8. See Johnson v. City of Rockford, No. 15 CV 50064, 2018 WL 1508482, at *4 n.1 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 27, 2018) (bemoaning that a "plethora of cases exist addressing the pernicious practice of
attorneys commandeering the preparation of expert reports").
9. See, e.g., KNAPP Logistics & Automation, Inc. v. R/X Automation Sols., Inc., No. 14-cv00319-RBJ, 2015 WL 5608124, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2015) (deriding counsel for creating
expert report filled with legal arguments outside the expert's expertise, treating the expert
"essentially as a puppet through which counsel will lecture the jury on the law and why [his client]
should win the case"); DataQuill Ltd. v. Handspring, Inc., No. 01 C 4635, 2003 WL 737785, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2003) (excluding expert report which included verbatim language from the
party's interrogatory answers concluding, "[w]e doubt the value to the trier of fact of a hired
expert's opinion when the party hiring him has put words in his mouth-or in this case, in his reportleaving him, in essence, a highly qualified puppet").
10. See, e.g., Numatics, Inc. v. Balluff, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 934, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
(noting that overinvolvement of the lawyer renders the expert "merely a party's lawyer's avatar

[who] contributes nothing useful to the decisional process"); accord HVLPO2, LLC v. Oxygen
Frog, LLC, No. 4:16cv336-MW/CAS, 2018 WL 2041370, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 16,2018) (quoting
Numatics, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 941).
11.

See also JoIiN W. GERGACZ, ATORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE

§ 7.55

(3d ed.

2019) (noting uncertainty as to the degree to which the Federal Rules limit exploration of the
lawyer's assistance in preparation of the expert report); cf MANGRAVITI ET AL., supra note 2, at11
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A related theme turns on how to control lawyer overreaching. In
extreme cases, exclusion of the expert's report and ultimate testimony
may be called for. In less extreme cases, the degree of involvement is
controlled, indirectly, by the potential that the level of assistance may
undercut the weight the trier of fact will give to the expert's testimony. If
the expert's credibility is diminished to the degree his work is seen as
the product of the non-expert lawyer's labor, lawyers have an incentive
to keep their assistance within bounds. These controls are discussed in
Part III of this Article. 13
For these controls to be effective, however, one needs a way to
identify the lawyer's involvement in the report's preparation. From
1993, when the expert report requirement was adopted, until 2010, this
was a relatively easy task as most courts allowed discovery of report
drafts and communication between counsel and the expert. Drafts, other
communications, and examinations at deposition were used to uncover
the role lawyers played in the creation of expert reports. In 2010, the
Federal Rules were amended to prohibit discovery of draft reports and to
dramatically curtail discovery of lawyer-expert communications.
Notably, the amendments did not explicitly address the permissible
degree of lawyer assistance but only the evidence that would be
available to identify it. Significant disagreement exists over the degree to
which the 2010 amendments curtail discovery of the lawyer's
involvement. This is discussed in Part IV of the Article.14
Some have argued that excessive lawyer involvement in the
creation of expert reports can be regulated through the lawyer
disciplinary system. Part V of this Article addresses that approach and
ultimately finds it wanting."
If we are concerned about excessive lawyer involvement in the
creation of expert reports, as I believe we should be, an expansive view
of the restrictions on discovery imposed by the 2010 amendments makes
policing such involvement very difficult at best. If that becomes the
norm, it will become important to devise alternative approaches to keep
lawyer behavior within acceptable bounds. Part VI of this Article sets
forth some possible alternatives to control this problem.16
With the degree of lawyer involvement purportedly on the rise,"
resolving these questions is of increasing importance."
(noting that the amount of assistance a lawyer may give to an expert in preparing the expert report

"is an extremely slippery slope").
12. See infta Part I.
13. See infra Part Ill.
14. See infra Part IV.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See, e.g., Steven Babitsky, Why Having Retaining Counsel Phrasing and Writing an
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II.
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THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN ASSISTING IN THE PREPARATION OF
EXPERT REPORTS

A.

The Pros and Cons ofLawyer Involvement in the
CreationofExpert Reports

1. The Need to Control Lawyer Assistance in the Creation of
Expert Reports
To sustain a claim or defense, a litigant must present witnesses of
an occurrence and/or tangible evidence to establish the facts. At times,
however, the implications of those facts are not readily apparent. Expert
testimony is necessary to help the trier of fact interpret the underlying
data. For example, one might agree that a doctor took certain steps in
carrying out a medical procedure but need expert testimony to determine
whether those steps fell below the ordinary standard of care. To meet
this end, the law allows the admission of expert testimony by those that,
although lacking first-hand knowledge of the incidents underlying a
claim or defense, have specialized training that qualify them to opine on
the consequences of those facts. It is the specialized knowledge of such
witnesses and the soundness of their methods that justify
their testimony. 9
Unlike a court-appointed expert whose task is to provide a truly
objective opinion, most experts testify on behalf of a party in the
litigation. 2 0In theory, the experts chosen by a party to testify also have
Expert Report Can Be a Problem, SEAK (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.testifyingtraining.com/whythat
(noting
having-retaining-counsel-phrasing-and-writing-an-expert-report-can-be-a-problem
"[e]xpert witnesses are getting more and more 'help' from retaining counsel in phrasing and writing
their reports").
18. While this Article focuses on testifying expert/lawyer interactions in federal court, in civil
actions, the same issues arise in state court civil practice. States take a variety of different
approaches. See Elizabeth V. Tanis et al., Expert Reports and Discovery: What You Need to Know
Under the Recently-Amended FederalRules of Civil Procedureand Select State Law, SU017 ALICLE 219 (2012). See generally Gwen Stern et al., Fishing Season Is Over: After Barrick and
Amended PennsylvaniaRule of Civil Procedure4003.5, Pennsylvania Reached the Right Decision
Regarding Work ProductProtectionsBetween Attorneys and Experts, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 329, 34055 (2015). The issue can arise in foreign proceedings as well. See, e.g., Shane Rayman et al., Expert
Evidence and the Expert's Duty to the Court, SA007 ALI-CLE 433 (2019) (addressing testifying
expert/lawyer communications under Canadian law). A separate body of law concerns expert
discovery and testimony in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Paul W. Grimm, Challenges Facing
Judges RegardingExpert Evidence in CriminalCases, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1601, 1603-11 (2018).
These topics, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
19. See FED. R. EvID. 702.
20. See generally Bradford H. Charles, Rule 706: An Underutilized Tool to Be Used When
PartisanExperts Become "HiredGuns", 60 VLL. L. REV. 941 (2015) (discussing public perception
and criticism of compensated partisan experts in litigation).
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objectively analyzed the situation. It is not the expert who is partisan, but
rather the partisan parties select experts who independently agree with
their positions.
Nevertheless, there is certainly a real-world chance that the
opinions of experts may be shaped by who employs them. Experts are
"at will" employees. An unsatisfactory opinion or an uncooperative
attitude may lead to dismissal or at least a decision not to call on the
expert to testify. Either alternative has negative compensation
implications. The desire to be hired in the future also can play a part.
These financial incentives can influence an expert's testimony. A human
desire to please those for whom one works and the reliance relationship
the expert has on counsel to provide certain facts and assumptions may
further taint the process. If the process is also shaped in partisan terms,
the expert is the witness for a party and, in the current scheme, is an
inside player with the lawyer, with many of their communications
protected from discovery, it is likely that some independence and
objectivity will be lost. 2 The greater the lawyer involvement in the
creation of the expert's testimony, the more these negative influences
can come into play.
If we start with the assumption that experts are allowed to testify
and share their opinions only because of their specialized knowledge and
ability to apply accepted principles and methods in their field, then we
need to assure that their reports and ultimate testimony, if any, are a
product of that knowledge and those methods. Lawyer involvement in
the preparation of the expert's report or in the shaping of the ultimate
testimony may undercut that paradigm. Excessive involvement may
usurp the expert's role and delegitimize the resulting product.2 2 Some
21. See, e.g., Easton, supra note 1, at 469-73 (noting these and other factors and concluding
that "it is difficult to imagine a system that would lead to more biased testimony"); Letter from 37
Law Professors, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y for the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 1, 2 (Nov. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Letter from 37 Law Professors]
(noting these and other factors and describing them as "the prime source of the pathologies of expert
testimony," while also noting that "[t]he rule that makes an expert witness's communications
broadly discoverable is an expression of the basic value of expert independence. Replacing it with a
rule that treated the expert more like a client for discovery purposes would send the wrong
message."); see also Sonenshein & Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 3-16 (exploring at length the forces
that lead to expert bias, concluding that "this system often leads to biased and partisan testimony
from experts").
22. As the court noted in Occulto v. Adamar ofN.J., Inc.:
A party receiving an adversary's expert's signed report has a right to rely
upon the document for what it purports to be-the expert's considered
analysis of facts and statement of opinions applying the expert's special
education, training and experience. Experts participate in a case because,
ultimately, the trier of fact will be assisted by their opinions .... They do not
participate as the alter-ego of the attorney who will be trying the case.
125 F.R.D. 611, 615-16 (D.N.J. 1989); accord Numatics, Inc. v. Balluff, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 934,
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believe that this will occur with regularity absent some curb on
the practice.23
2. The Need to Allow Some Lawyer Assistance in the Creation of
Expert Reports
Lawyer involvement in the creation of expert reports and testimony
has its advantages. The lawyer can define the expert's task by sharing
data and assumptions to be utilized in forming opinions. This input is
discoverable as it underlies whatever opinions the expert puts forward.2 4
The lawyer also should play a role in assuring that the expert's report
complies with the technicalities of the report rule, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). 2 5Most also would agree that the lawyer should
play a role in assuring that the expert's report is both accurate and
clear. 2 6 The lawyer can help assure that the language used is clear and
not misleading. An additional editorial flare to make the report more
persuasive is commonly thought as fairly within the game.2 7
B.

Difering Conceptions of the Lawyer's Role

As the 1993 Advisory Committee Note makes clear, there is a role
for the lawyer to play in assisting an expert in the creation of his
testimony which is then transmitted in the required expert report. There
is disagreement, however, about what that role should be.2 8 Several
conceptions of the lawyer's role play out in the court opinions
attempting to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable
lawyer assistance.
1. Lawyer as Drafter and the Ghostwriting Analogy
The most problematic cases are those in which the lawyer simply
drafts the report, without initial input from the expert, and asks the
expert to sign it. Arguably, if the expert accepts the report as his or her
own, that is now the expert's opinion and in the words of the Advisory
Committee Note, the report "reflects the testimony to be given by the
943 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (quoting Occulto, 125 F.R.D. at 615-16).
23. Johnson v. City of Rockford, No. 15 CV 50064, 2018 WL 1508482, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
27,2018).
24. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(ii)-(iii).
25. See infra Part H.B.3.
26. See generally infra Parts H.B.2-4.
27. See infra text accompanying note 53.
28. See generally Megan S. Largent, Applying the American Bar Association's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Shane Rayman's Observations
and Study of CanadianLaw in Expert Evidence and the Expert's Duty to the Court, SA007 ALI-

CLE 459 (Jan. 2019) (describing the line between permissible and impermissible lawyer assistance
in preparation ofthe expert report as "ill-defined").
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witness." 2 9Whether or not the expert can adequately defend that opinion
becomes a question to be ferreted out by cross-examination.
Some cases can be read to approve this practice. 3 0 Others criticize
the practice, but nevertheless do not believe exclusion of the testimony is
always required. 3 'Giving counsel that significant a role, however, is
most often seen as improper. 3 2 Rule 26(a)(2) not only requires that the

29.

FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.

30. See., e.g., Maxson v. Calder Bros., No. 4:14CV01360 AGF, 2015 WL 4715955, at *1-2,
*3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 7, 2015) (noting that "generally, when an expert reads and signs a report
prepared by counsel, the report is viewed as the expert's" in case where court noted discussion
between counsel and the expert preceding delivery of the report to the expert, the report was

identical to those of three other experts, and included opinions on matters for which the expert was
unqualified and which he later disowned); United States ex rel. Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp.,
No. CV 95-2985 ABC (Ex), 2003 WL 27366249, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2003) (finding that
"even if much of the [expert's report] was 'fully developed' [by counsel] when it reached [the
expert], [the expert's] adoption of the report is sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule
26(a)(2)(B)").
31. See, e.g., Harmon v. United States, No. PX 15-2611, 2017 WL 4098742, at *9 (D. Md.
Sept. 15, 2017) (finding that while counsel's drafting of two expert witness reports was "illadvised," it did not warrant exclusion where the experts subsequently determined the reports

"accurately reflected their conclusions"); Smith v. Teumo Cardiovascular Sys. Corp., No. 2:12-cv00998-DN, 2017 WL 8186899, at *1-2 (D. Utah Aug. 7, 2017) (finding it permissible for the expert
report to have been drafted by the lawyer but "strongly encourag[ing]" the adoption of a different
practice in the future); O'Hara v. Travelers, No. 2:11-CV-208-KS-MTP, 2012 WL 3062300, at *9
(S.D. Miss. July 26, 2012) (acknowledging that while an attorney simply writing the report without
the expert's input and then requesting its adoption by signature violates the rule, "the Court does not

hold that 'ghost-writing,' by itself, is sufficient to render testimony unreliable [and thus excludable]
for Daubertpurposes, [but] it should be a factor in the Court's analysis"); Fed. Beef Processors, Inc.
v. Royal Indem. Co., No. CIV. 04-5005-KES, 2008 WL 6953895, at *2 (D.S.D. July 18, 2008)
(finding the failure of the expert to have any input in the report "troubling," but finding it harmless
error, and thus excused conduct under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, because an attachment to

the report was prepared by the expert and because the expert explained, in his deposition, which
portions of the report reflected his opinion). Even if the practice does not violate the Federal Rules,
it still presents a risky course as the expert will be less likely to be able to explain and defend the
report. See Stuart, supra note 1 (pointing out that such a report "will,by all accounts, lead to an

ineffective expert who can be discredited on cross-examination").
32. MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, ¶26.23[5] ("The better view rejects the contention that a
report prepared by counsel is the report of the expert, even if the expert 'substantially' agrees with
its conclusions."). The most cited case here is Manning v. Crockett, where the court stated:

[P]reparing the expert's opinion from whole cloth and then asking the expert to sign it if
he or she wishes to adopt it conflicts with Rule 26(a)(2)(B)'s requirement that the expert
"prepare" the report. Preparation implies involvement other than perusing a report
drafted by someone else and signing one's name at the bottom to signify agreement.
No. 95 C 3117, 1999 WL 342715, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 1999). Cf Anders v. United States, 307
F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1312-14 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (finding expert testimony unreliable where the expert
incorporated lawyer-drafted opinions into his expert report and then lied under oath, claiming he
had independently authored that portion ofhis report); DataQuill Ltd. v. Handspring, Inc., No. 01 C
4635, 2003 WL 737785, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2003) (excluding expert report which included
verbatim language from the party's interrogatory answers and concluding, "[w]e doubt the value to

the trier of fact of a hired expert's opinion when the party hiring him has put words in his mouth-or
in this case, in his report-leaving him, in essence, a highly qualified puppet").
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expert sign the report, but also that the expert "prepare]" it. Further,
while the Advisory Committee Note contemplates that attorneys may
participate in the process, their role is limited to "providing
assistance." 3 4Assistance implies a lesser role than serving as sole or
even principal author.
The analogy here is often to the concept of ghostwriting-the
expert's name is on the report, but the report really reflects the efforts of
the lawyer." Concerns about lawyer ghostwriting have largely arisen in
the context of attorney preparation of pleadings which individuals then
file pro se as their own. Pro se pleadings are treated leniently to
compensate for the lack of legal training of most who file them. 38 That
leniency would not be given to a lawyer-drafted pleading. Filing a
pleading that appears as though it was drafted by the party when it was
really drafted by a lawyer provides that individual an unfair and
unwarrantedadvantage.3 9
A similar, though distinct, unfair and unwarranted advantage can
occur when the expert's report is predominantly the work of a lawyer.
Were the lawyer to directly offer the opinions in the report, they would
not be admissible in evidence. 4 0 Even if they were, they would be seen
as the views of a partisan untrained in the area covered by the testimony.

33. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B); see Manning, 1999 WL 342715, at *3 (noting that to allow
"an expert to sign a report drafted entirely by counsel without prior substantive input from an expert
would read the word 'prepared' completely out of the rule").
34. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
35.

See MOORE ET AL., supra note 6,

§

26.23[4] (noting that "the rule does not contemplate

blanket adoption of reports prepared by counsel").
36. See, e.g., O'Hara v. Travelers, No. 2:11-CV-208-KS-MTP, 2012 WL 3062300, at *9
(S.D. Miss. July 26, 2012) (noting that "the inherent deception involved in such 'ghost-writing'
taints the proposed expert testimony to a degree that its reliability may be questioned. Although the
Court does not hold that 'ghost-writing,' by itself, is sufficient to render testimony unreliable for
Daubertpurposes, it should be a factor in the Court's analysis."); McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., 710 F.
Supp. 2d 1092, 1118 (D. Or. 2010) (noting that "an expert report 'ghost-written' from 'whole cloth'
violates the spirit, if not the letter of the Rule").
37. Court decisions and ethics opinions are split on the propriety of ghostwriting in this
context. For a recent article summarizing this split, see Debra Lyn Bassett, Characterizing

Ghostwriting, 5 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 286,291-96 (2015).
38. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (noting that allegations in pro se
complaints are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers").
39. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 37, at 300-02 (noting this as the most common concem
raised by those opposed to ghostwriting in this context). But cf ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof1
Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446, at 3 (2007) (arguing that if the lawyer's input is valuable, it will
be obvious on the face of the pleading and the court can decline to give special deference). Other
concerns are that the practice is deceptive, and that it possibly undercuts the lawyer's accountability
for the work product. See, e.g., Halley Acklie Ostergard, Note, Unmasking the Ghost: Rectifying
GhostwritingandLimited-Scope Representation with the Ethicaland ProceduralRules, 92 NEB. L.

REv. 655, 659-60, 664 (2014) (collecting cases).
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
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When the expert serves as the conduit for the lawyer's thoughts, the
opinions, if the expert meets the evidentiary standards to allow the
expert's testimony, are given great weight. The expert often has strong
credentials which are presented to assure the admission of the expert's
testimony. This may be accompanied by a judicial declaration that the
person is a qualified expert based on his or her training and experience
who can help the trier of fact in the matter. Such experts may have
particularly honed communication skills in an otherwise technical area.
Thus, a jury may give the opinions expressed by experts greater weight
than those of others.4 1
In Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., the federal district court for
the Northern District of California laid plain the concern. The court
noted that:
[W]ith respect to expert witnesses in particular, there is, inevitably, a
dense and probatively significant interdependence between, on the one
hand, the opinions and reasoning they present in testimony and, on the
other, their background, experience, and personal characteristics and
attributes.
Given that interdependence, it would be fundamentally misleading,
and could do great damage to the integrity of the truth finding process,
if testimony that was being presented as the independent thinking of an
"expert" in fact was the product, in whole or significant part, of the
suggestions of counsel. The trier of fact has a right to know who is
testifying. If it is the lawyer who really is testifying, surreptitiously
through the expert (i.e., if the expert is in any significant measure
parroting views that are really the lawyer's), it would be fundamentally
unfair to the truth finding process to lead the jury or court to believe
that the background and personal attributes of the expert should be
taken into account when the persuasive power of the testimony
is assessed.4 2
2. Lawyer as Mere Scrivener
On the other end of the spectrum, there is near universal approval
of the lawyer as scrivener. 4 3 In these cases the expert typically has set
out the underlying facts, assumptions, findings, and opinions orally or in
41.

See, e.g., Easton, supra note 1, at 480-91.

42. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 395-96 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
43. See, e.g., Bryntesen v. Camp Auto., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00491-BLW, 2015 WL 248002, at
*4 (D. Idaho Jan. 20, 2015) (noting that "if counsel acts as a scrivener, and the expert supplies the
substantive content for the written report, the report is nonetheless 'prepared' by the expert within

the meaning of the rule"); Weekes v. Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp., No. 1:10-c-566-BLW,
2011 WL 6140967, at *4 (D. Idaho Dec. 9, 2011); Wilderness Dev., LLC v. Hash, No. CV 08-54M-JCL, 2009 WL 564224, at *4 (D. Mont. Mar. 5, 2009); Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530,
543-45 (D.N.J. 2004).
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a number of memoranda and the lawyer simply records the information
in proper form for an expert witness report. The lawyer is largely a
transcriber, although one allowed a little grammatical license. Here the
report seems clearly prepared by the expert even if the expert or his staff
did not type it.
3. Lawyer as Compliance Counsel
Some cases stress that the requirements for the expert report
required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are rigorous and that
those untrained in the law, without the assistance of lawyers, may not
know how to meet them." Under this conception of the lawyer's role,
the lawyer should be involved, providing assistance to make sure the
report is complete. The lawyer should work with the expert to assure that
the report contains all that Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires. 4 5 The role of the
lawyer is as a quality-control agent.' The lawyer is to make sure that
nothing pertinent is left out of the report that otherwise should be there.4 7

44. See, e.g., Numatics, Inc. v. Balluff, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 934, 943 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
(noting that "[i]n most cases, expert witnesses are not attorneys, and they may not apprehend the
required components of a report set forth in Rule 26(a)(2)(B). The retaining attorney certainly may
explain the rule's requirements and coach the expert to be sure the report touches all the bases"); see
also Manning v. Crockett, No. 95 C 3117, 1999 WL 342715, at *3 (N.D. I. May 18, 1999); Marek
v. Moore, 171 F.R.D. 298, 301 (D. Kan. 1997) (noting that "[u]nlike the attorney, the expert witness
more likely preoccupies himself with his profession or field of expertise. He may have little
appreciation or none whatsoever for Rule 26 and its exacting requirements for a legally 'complete'
report of the expert opinions, including all the 'data or other information' and designating all
supporting exhibits . . .. [and concluding that] [t]o help ensure complete disclosure of the required
information, counsel ordinarily should supervise preparation of the expert's witness report.").
45. See, e.g., Numatics, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 942 (noting that lawyer assistance to experts
"generally is limited to ensuring that Rule 26's formal requirements are satisfied"); James T.
Scatuorchio Racing Stable, LLC v. Walmac Stud Mgmt., LLC, No. 5:11-374-DCR, 2014 WL
1744848, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 2014); cf Manning, 1999 WL 342715, at *3 (noting that "certain
kinds of help are clearly in tune with the concept of assisting the expert .... [such as] an attorney's
assistance with the preparation of documents required by Rule 26, such as a list of cases in which
the expert has testified, or fine-tuning a disclosure with the expert's input to ensure that it complies
with the rules").
46. Straying beyond quality control to having an impact on the substance of the testimony
may be a step too far. See, e.g., In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 98-05162-R, 908-05166-,
2005 WL 6725897, at *11 n.8 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. May 10, 2005) (stating that "[a]ssistance by
counsel in drafting expert's report is expected in connection with complying with the formalities
required of Rule 26 (to insure that the report contains all information required by Rule 26 and
completely discloses information considered by the expert, for instance), but not with respect to the
substance of the expert's opinions," although determining that excessive assistance goes to the
weight of the testimony, not its admissibility).
47. Marek, 171 F.R.D. at 301 (noting the importance of the lawyer in assuring the report
comports with Rule 26(a)(2)(B)'s requirements to avoid possible exclusion of the report if it were
incomplete).
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As such, "counsel's assistance is generally limited to helping the expert
draft a report in a way that satisfies the requirements of Rule 26."4
4. Lawyer as Speaker for the Inarticulate
In explaining proper lawyer assistance to experts in preparing their
reports, the Advisory Committee noted that "with experts such as
automobile mechanics, this assistance may be needed." 4 9 The import of
the comment is that some experts are not accustomed to communicating
in writing and may need lawyer assistance to do so. If that is meant to be
the paradigm for lawyer involvement, then lawyers, arguably, should not
provide assistance when experts can prepare their own reports.o
5. Lawyer as Collaborator
Most of the court opinions in this area embrace the role of lawyer
The rules already contemplate that lawyers may
as collaborator."
communicate with the expert concerning "compensation for the expert's
study or testimony," "facts or data" to be considered, and "assumptions"
to be relied upon. 5 2 The cases go further and allow the lawyer to help
shape the testimony itself, including presenting it in a more persuasive
voice, as long as the expert "substantially participated" in the report's
creation, or words to that effect. 5 3 A few courts shift the emphasis from

48. Scatuorchio, 2014 WL 1744848, at *6.
49. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
50. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Beechcraft Corp., No. 15-CV-0129-CVE-PJC, 2017 WL 979100, at
*6 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2017) (in evaluating whether the expert played a substantial role in creating
the expert report, the court noted that "[the Advisory Committee Notes reference 'automobile
mechanics' as a type of witness who may need assistance, and this could reasonably refer to a
category of expert witnesses less familiar with writing reports or who intend to testify primarily on
the basis of training or experience instead of academic requirements;" finding assistance to highly
educated experts improper since "[t]he Advisory Committee Notes contemplate attorney
'assistance' in limited circumstances, but plaintiffs have not shown that this is a situation in which it
was necessary for plaintiffs' counsel to completely draft the report for [the expert]"); Smith v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 164 F.R.D. 49, 54 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (citing language from the Advisory
Committee Note to distinguish automobile mechanics from "[p]laintiffs' experts . . . primarily
attorneys and claims representatives, who are experienced in writing reports and expressing
opinions").
51. See, e.g., Insight Tech., Inc. v. SureFire, LLC, No. 04-cv-74-JD, 2007 WL 3244092, at *8
(D.N.H. Nov. 1, 2007) (approving the lawyer and expert engaging in a "collaborative process").
52. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
53. See, e.g., Manning v. Crockett, No. 95 C 3117,1999 WL 342715, at *3 (N.D. 111. May 18,
1999) (acknowledging lawyer assistance is proper, but emphasizing that the "expert must also
substantially participate in the preparation of his report"); accord Rodgers, 2017 WL 979100, at *5
(relying on Manning for this proposition); Tindall v. H & S Homes, LLC, No. 5:10-CV-044 CAR,
2012 WL 3241885, at *1-2 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2012) (citing Manning, 1999 WL 342715, at *3); see
also In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 714 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(describing the proper focus of inquiry as whether the expert "offered substantial input into what
was put into the report" (quoting Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530, 544 (D.N.J. 2004)));
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substantial participation by the expert to a concern that the report's
substance accurately reflect the expert's opinions. 54 In reality both are
required," although substantial participation should lead to opinions that
accurately reflect the expert's views.
The typical scenario in which this approach is explored is where the
lawyer is the drafter of the report and the question becomes whether the
expert's contribution is substantial. Numerous cases have found it
permissible for the lawyer to prepare the first draft of the report based on
input from the expert and to draft the final report after the expert has
reviewed it, made corrections as necessary, and adopted it as his own.5 6
The best analogy here is to a lawyer's coaching of witnesses.
While there are critics of the current witness-coaching practices,
substantial leeway is given to lawyers in this regard. As the Restatement
(Third) of the Law GoverningLawyers provides:
In preparing a witness to testify, a lawyer may invite the witness to
provide truthful testimony favorable to the lawyer's client. Preparation
consistent with the rule of this Section may include the following:
discussing the role of the witness and effective courtroom demeanor;
discussing the witness's recollection and probable testimony; revealing
to the witness other testimony or evidence that will be presented and
asking the witness to reconsider the witness's recollection or
recounting of events in that light; discussing the applicability of law to
the events in issue; reviewing the factual context into which the
witness's observations or opinions will fit; reviewing documents or
other physical evidence that may be introduced; and discussing
probable lines of hostile cross-examination that the witness should be
Bekaert Corp. v. City of Dyersburg, 256 F.R.D. 573, 578 (W.D. Tenn. 2009); Keystone Mfg. Co. v.
Jaccard Corp., 394 F. Supp. 2d 543, 568 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
54. E.g., Seitz v. Envirotech Sys. Worldwide Inc., No. H-02-4782, 2008 WL 656513, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2008) (citing Manning, 1999 WL 342715, at *3, for the proposition that "as long
as the substance of the opinions is from the expert, the attorney's involvement in the written
expression of those opinions does not make them inadmissible"); accord Tech Pharmacy Servs.,
LLC v. Alixa Rx LLC, No. 4:15-CV-766, 2017 WL 3388020, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2017)
(quoting Seitz, 2008 WL 656513, at *2).
55. Cf Tech PharmacyServs., 2017 WL 3388020, at *2 (citing both standards).
56. See, e.g., McDonald v. City ofMemphis, No. 2:12-c-2511-SHL-dkv, 2016 WL 8201168,
at *11 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 2016); Tindall, 2012 WL 3241885, at *1-2, *3; Hoskins v. Gunn
Trucking, No. 4:07-CV-72-WCL, 2009 WL 2970399, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 14,2009).
57.

Cf Tess M.S. Neal, Expert Witness Preparation: What Does the Literature Tell Us?,

JURY EXPERT, Mar. 2009, at 44-46, 48 (providing a literature review of how to prepare experts to
testify, including the manipulation of language for persuasiveness).
58.

See generally Roberta K. Flowers, Witness Preparation:Regulating the Profession's

"DirtyLittle Secret", 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1007 (2011) (discussing the need to develop clear
standards governing witness preparation); Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17

CARDozO L. REv. 1 (1995) (discussing the characteristics and effects of witness coaching that
should be considered ethical violations).
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prepared to meet. Witness preparation may include rehearsal of
testimony. A lawyer may suggest choice of words that might be
employed to make the witness's meaning clear.59
In helping the expert prepare the report, the lawyer arguably is
doing no more than "suggest[ing] choice of words that might be
employed to make the witness's meaning clear."6 0 That, however,
understates the lawyer's role. To see this, we might draw a distinction
between occurrence witnesses and expert witnesses. The former are
testifying about what they observed. Permissible coaching is not to
change the testimony itself, simply its presentation. With respect to
experts, in contrast, the lawyer is helping the expert form the very
opinions to be proffered as testimony and thus potentially plays a role in
creating the very substance of the testimony to be provided.6 1
That distinction, however, may not be as stark as it appears. In
preparing a lay witness, careful examination of the witness as part of the
witness's preparation might in fact change the testimony itself. Indeed,
that is one of the oft-cited concerns about witness coaching.6 2 Further,
even if the expert has not observed events about which to testify, the
expert comes in with a skill set to develop, evaluate, and form opinions
within his or her field of expertise. This skill set may make experts less
susceptible to lawyer influence over the substance of their testimony
than are lay witnesses.
Even if courts generally embrace this model, sometimes that
collaboration can go too far. 6 3 For example, in one case, the lawyer who
provided assistance was also an expert in the area. Rather than simply
assisting the expert by providing some basic information and editorial
collaboration, the lawyer contributed to the actual study and its
conclusions. Even though the expert played a substantial role in creating

59.
INST.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§116

cmt. b. (AM. LAW.

2000).

60. Id.
61. Letter from Stephen D. Easton, C.A. Leedy Professor of Law & Curators Distinguished
Teaching Professor, Univ. of Missouri Sch. of Law, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y for the Comm. on
Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Feb. 16, 2009) [hereinafter
Easton Letter]; cf Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 396-97 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(noting that "[t]he fact that so much expert testimony concerns matters that are essentially out of
empirical control makes it all the more important for the trier of fact to know, accurately, the source
of the testimony").
62. See, e.g., wydick, supra note 58, at 12; see also Lisa Renee Salmi, Note, Don't Walk the
Line: Ethical Considerationsin PreparingWitnesses for Deposition and Trial, 18 REv. LrrIG. 135,

157-63 (1999).
63. Cf Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 90 n.3 (1976) (noting, in the context of the
propriety of a lawyer discussing matters with a client during trial, that "[a]n attorney must respect

the important ethical distinction between discussing testimony and seeking improperly to influence
it").
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the testimony and preparing the report, the lawyer's serving as a coexpert was seen as a step too far.6 4
It should also be noted that the collaborative model is not without
its critics. As one court explained:
Moreover, real harm to the truth finding process, as well as to public
confidence in the integrity of our system of justice, can be done even
when the influence a lawyer has on an expert's testimony is
substantially more subtle and less flagrant than was the case in the
"parroting" scenario that occurred in Occulto. If it occurs at a key
analytical juncture, even a modest and subtle redirection of an expert's
emphasis, focus, or line of reasoning could have a major impact on the
ultimate conclusion or opinion she reaches. Such redirection could be
effected (sic) through conversation, written suggestion, or even in the
way counsel package and deliver information to the expert. We are
aware that at least some lawyers take professional pride in their ability
to indirectly "control" their experts, e.g., through the timing or
sequencing of the data/information they give the experts. Thus, we
need not posit gross and clumsy corruption of the process to feel
substantial concern about preserving (or promoting) the reality of
independence in thinking that is presented to a jury as independent.6 5
C.

The Case Law in Operation

As the foregoing illustrates, there is no consensus as the proper role
for lawyers in assisting in the preparation of expert witness reports. As a
practical matter, however, lawyers acting as a scrivener, compliance
officer, or a speaker for the inarticulate is well accepted.6 6 The
collaboration model also has been approved in the abstract, but at times
the collaboration exceeds the limits of what is acceptable. To act as the
principal drafter of the report, however, is seen by many as a step
too far. 6 7 This Subpart moves beyond an abstract discussion of the
lawyer's role and steps into the weeds of the court decisions that have
addressed where to draw the line between proper and improper lawyer
assistance.
64. United States ex rel. Barron v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. SA-99-CA-1093-FB, 2008
WL 7136868, at *4-6 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2008) (disqualifying the expert and excluding her report
and testimony on this ground). Contrast that case with Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, in
which the court approved assistance to the expert such as "obtaining the sample of files,
categorizing the files in the sample, and implementing the statistical protocol" the expert had
developed. 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing to the Advisory Committee Note
on permissible assistance by counsel).
65. Intermedics, 139 F.R.D. at 396.
66. See supra Part I.B.2-5.
67. See supra Part I.B.1.
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Numerous opinions acknowledge that there is no bright-line test for
when lawyer involvement in the creation of expert reports goes too far.
Rather it is a case-by-case determination." Nevertheless, looking at
those cases where courts found counsel's assistance excessive helps
provide a lens through which the case-by-case determination can
be made.
1. Cases in Which Lawyer Assistance Renders the Expert's
Report Invalid
There are two different ways courts approach this issue. One is to
focus on the comparative roles of counsel and the expert in preparing the
report. 6 9 The other is to consider whether outside pressures influenced
the expert's report.7 0
Under the first approach, one might focus on the conduct of counsel
to determine if the assistance provided exceeds permissible bounds or on
the degree to which the expert participated in the creation of her own
report. In reality, I suspect both are considered.7 1
The second approach purports to analyze the motive of the expert.
The report is considered improper if it appears the report was completed
"merely for appeasement or because of intimidation or some undue
influence by the party or counsel who has retained him."7 2
In practice, the courts appear to rely far more heavily on the first
type of analysis than the second. 7 3 The concern is raised in a variety of
similar ways. Thus, a problem arises where the lawyer "prepar[es] the
expert's opinion from whole cloth and then ask[s] the expert to sign it."7 4
68. See, e.g., McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., 710 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1118 (D. Or. 2010)
(describing the analysis as a "fact-specific inquiry"); accord Numatics, Inc. v. Balluff, Inc., 66 F.
Supp. 3d 934, 942 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (quoting McClellan, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 1118); Rhinehart v.
Scutt, No. 2:11-cv-11254, 2017 WL 1395887, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2017) (quoting Numatics,
66 F. Supp. 3d at 942).
69. Marekv. Moore, 171 F.R.D. 298,299,301 (D. Kan. 1997).
70. Id. at 302.
71. See, e.g., Bekaert Corp. v. City of Dyersburg, 256 F.R.D. 573, 578 (W.D. Tenn. 2009)
(commenting that "[w]hether an expert report was prepared in a manner consistent with the
mandates of Rule 26, usually turns on whether counsel's participation so exceeds the bounds of
legitimate assistance as to negate the possibility that the expert actually prepared his own report, i.e.
the expert must substantially participate in the preparation of his report.").
72. Marek, 171 F.R.D. at 302; accord Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 292
(E.D. Va. 2001) (quoting id.); see also Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Health, LLC, No. 13-cv-832wnc, 2015 WL 1520821, at *13 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 3, 2015) (quoting Marek, 171 F.R.D. at 302);
McClellan, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 (quoting Trigon, 204 F.R.D at 292).
73. See, e.g., Trigon, 204 F.R.D. at 292; Marek, 171 F.R.D. at 302. See also notes 74-90 and
accompanying text.
74. Manning v. Crockett, No. 95 C 3117, 1999 WL 342715, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 1999);
accord Seitz v. Envirotech Sys. Worldwide Inc., No. H-02-4782, 2008 WL 656513, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 6, 2008); see also United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, 319 F.R.D. 498, 510 (N.D.
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It is other times noted that "preparation" means involvement in the
creation of the report rather than "perusing a report drafted by someone
else and signing one's name at the bottom to signify agreement"7 5 or that
"preparing a report implies involvement other than reviewing a report
drafted by someone else and signing one's name in agreement with
the contents."7 6
In reviewing the cases in which the court ordered exclusion of the
expert report because of excessive lawyer involvement and insufficient
expert input, several patterns emerge. The clearest cases are those where
the lawyer writes the report and the expert merely signs it and adopts it
as her own.7 Here the lawyer has done way too much and the expert
way too little. But the situation need not be that extreme. In a number of
cases, reports have been excluded where the lawyer created a first draft
of the report with no input from the expert, the expert reviewed the
report before adopting it but made few if any substantive changes.
Absent evidence of extensive reworking of the report by the expert, this
situation is a close cousin to the first.
The same problem may happen in reverse. If the expert prepares a
first draft that is substantially changed substantively by the lawyer after
the lawyer reviews it, that may suggest that the final report contains the
views of the lawyer rather than the expert.7 9

Tex. 2016).
75. Manning, 1999 WL 342715, at *3; accordNumatics, Inc. v. Balluff, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d
934, 942 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (quoting id.); Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d 530, 543 (D.N.J. 2004)
(quoting Manning, 1999 WL 342715, at *3); see also Trigon, 204 F.R.D. at 293.
76. United States ex rel. Barron v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. SA-99-CA-1093-FB, 2008
WL 7136868, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26,2008).
77. See, e.g., Stein v. Foamex Int'l, Inc., No. CIV. A. 00-2356, 2001 WL 936566, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 15, 2001) (finding Rule violated where expert played "no apparent role" in drafting the
report other than signing it); cf O'Hara v. Travelers, No. 2:11-CV-208-KS-MTP, 2012 WL
3062300, at *9,*10 (S.D. Miss. July 26, 2012) (applying this principle in an instance where the draft
was written by the party, rather than the lawyer, and treating it as one of the factors leading to
exclusion of the expert's testimony).
78. See, e.g., Patent Category Corp. v. Target Corp., No. CV 06-7311 CAS (CWx), 2008 WL
11336468, at *4, *5 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2008) (excluding testimony where first draft of report was
prepared before the expert was hired and the expert made only a few changes; the court concluded,
"it is clear that [the expert] did not prepare his expert reports, he did not assist defense counsel in
drafting the reports, nor did defense counsel draft the reports under [the expert's] supervision.
Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that [the expert's] expert testimony must be
precluded."); see also St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. v. Tormey, No. 11-327 (MJD/TNL), 2013 WL
3270382, at *6, *8 (D. Minn. June 26, 2013) (excluding expert where counsel wrote report before
expert first saw it).
79. See, e.g., Cantrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. CIV 12-0129 KBM/SMV, 2013 WL 8632378, at
*5 (D.N.M. June 28, 2013) (excluding expert's opinions as unreliable, noting that expert's
"attorney-authored final expert report contains opinions that dramatically differ from [the expert's]
original one paragraph opinion letter to counsel after seeing Plaintiff just one
time.... [s]uggest[ing] that his final opinions were formed with a litigation purpose, and the
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Other factors often are cited to support the proposition that the
expert did not sufficiently participate in the report's creation. In some
instances, the expert admits at deposition that they did not in fact review
documents upon which the expert's opinion was formedso or at least did
not spend sufficient time reviewing them to reflect a serious
consideration of them." Other times the expert, at deposition, disavows
certain opinions in the report, 82 is unable to defend it," or reveals that it
contains opinions clearly outside of the expert's expertise.8 A close look
at the timing of the expert's input also can suggest a lack of
involvement. For example, in Weekes v. Ohio National Life Assurance
Corp.," the court ultimately struck the expert report and excluded the
expert's testimony where counsel prepared and submitted the disclosure
before the expert finalized his opinion. The court did so even though the
expert had spent twelve hours on the matter and engaged in two
teleconferences with counsel. The court interpreted this timing anomaly,
and other factors, as "suggesting that counsel-not the expert-provided

circumstances indicate a lack of independence [of the expert]").
80. See, e.g., id., at *7; O'Hara, 2012 WL 3062300, at *9.
81. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Beechcraft Corp., No. 15-CV-0129-CVE-PJC, 2017 WL 979100, at
*5 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2017); James T. Scatuorchio Racing Stable, LLC v. Walmac Stud Mgmt.,
LLC, No. 5:11-374-DCR, 2014 WL 1744848, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 2014) (treating limited time
expert spent in reviewing and revising report prepared by counsel as a factor in finding expert
lacked sufficient input to be seen as "preparing" the expert report); Numatics, Inc. v. Balluff, Inc.,
66 F. Supp. 3d 934, 942 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (noting among other factors in excluding the report that
"[t]he plaintiff says that [the expert] represented that he spent less than eight hours reviewing
technical literature, prior art references, and the patent; and he implausibly says that he reviewed
nearly 2,600 pages of deposition transcripts in two to three hours"). But cf Accentra Inc. v. Staples,
Inc., No. CV 07-5862 ABC (RZx), 2010 WL 11459205, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2010) (finding that
spending only three to four hours on a report did not make it unreliable where the "report was just
over two pages and was not particularly complicated"and the expert had assistance from counsel,
but acknowledging that the assistance of counsel matter could be brought up to challenge the weight
of the opinion).
82. See Rodgers, 2017 WL 979100, at *6 (noting that the expert denied that he "personally
had any knowledge supporting several of the opinions offered in the report").
83. See, e.g., DataQuill Ltd. v. Handspring, Inc., No. 01 C 4635, 2003 WL 737785, at *4
(N.D. M. Feb. 28, 2003); Stein v. Foamex Int'l, Inc., No. CIV. A. 00-2356, 2001 WL 936566, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2001). But see Tindall v. H & S Homes, LLC, No. 5:10-CV-044(CAR), 2012
WL 3241885, at *2, *3 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2012) (holding that although deposition showed that
expert "was unable to recognize blatant errors and misstatements in the Affidavit," could not

explain a principle asserted in the affidavit, and claimed to rely on sources he did not have, it would
not strike the affidavit finding instead "that these matters are more aptly considered in the context of
[the expert's] credibility as a witness").

84. See, e.g., KNAPP Logistics & Automation, Inc. v. R/X Automation Solutions, Inc., No.
14-cv-00319-RBJ, 2015 WL 5608124, at *1, *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2015) (deriding counsel for
creating expert report filled with legal arguments outside the expert's expertise, treating the expert
"essentially as a puppet through which counsel will lecture the jury on the law and why [his client]
should win the case," but allowing report to stand and the expert to testify).
85. No. 1:10-cv-566-BLW, 2011 WL 6140967, at *5 (D. Idaho Dec. 9, 2011).
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the substantive leadership in preparing the expert's report"8 6 which
warranted the report's exclusion.
While not in and of itself dispositive, substantial similarities in the
language used in the expert report and language used in other expert
reports 8 7 or in other documents" may suggest the lawyer has played too
much of a guiding hand.
So too would be the lawyers' participation in the actual study upon
which the expert's opinion is based. Lawyers are expected to provide
some factual information for the expert to consider and some
assumptions to rely upon, but further entanglement in the study being
conducted may go too far.8 9
Ultimately, the court will look at the totality of the circumstances.9 0
Multiple indicia of lawyer over-involvement and expert under86. Id.; see also Rodgers, 2017 WL 979100, at *2, *6, *7 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2017)
(excluding the report in part because the expert only received important documents he was to review
late in the process, only began reviewing them on January 30 with the report due on February 1, and
spent only one hour preparing, reading, and editing the report drafted by counsel).
87. See, e.g., In re Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. Premium Litig., No. 96-MD-1122, 2000 WL
33654070, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2000) (finding "undeniable substantial similarities" between
the expert report and another expert report in an unrelated case involving the same counsel was
proof that the lawyer's actions "so exceeded the bounds of legitimate 'assistance' as to negate the
possibility that [the expert] actually prepared his own report within the meaning of Rule 26(a)(2)").
But cf McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., 710 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1118, 1127 (D. Or. 2010) (allowing expert
report and testimony despite evidence that two expert reports were, in part, similar if not identical,
among other factors).
88. Compare DataQuill, 2003 WL 737785, at *4 (finding that where report contained large
quantities of language verbatim from interrogatory responses, the report was insufficient, as the
expert was acting as but "a highly qualified puppet"), with Tech Pharmacy Servs., LLC v. Alixa Rx
LLC, No. 4:15-CV-766, 2017 WL 3388020, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2017) (finding expert
sufficiently involved in preparing his report where only five of forty-three paragraphs duplicated
language from previously-filed lawyer briefs). But cf Manning v. Crockett, No. 95 C 3117, 1999
WL 342715, at *4 (N.D. I. May 18, 1999) (finding commonalities in language between the
complaint and expert's opinion, but concluding that it could not "exclude the possibility that the
complaint was drawn from [the expert's] opinions rather than the other way around"). Accord
Kenall Mfg. Co. v. Genlyte Thomas Grp. LLC, 413 F. Supp. 2d 937, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing
Manning, 1999 WL 342715, at *1, *2, *3, *4); Solaia Tech. LLC v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 361 F.
Supp. 2d 797, 805 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing id. at *1, *2, *3, *4); see also McDonald v. City of
Memphis, No. 2:12-cv-2511-SHL-dkv, 2016 WL 8201168, at *11 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 2016)
(finding "without merit" defendant's argument of impropriety based on its claim "that significant
portions of [the expert's] report are either verbatim or incredibly similar" to another expert's report
in the case).
89. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Barron v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. SA-99-CA-1093FB, 2008 WL 7136868, at *5, *11 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2008) (excluding expert's testimony where
lawyer assisting the expert acted as co-author in the report's creation). But cf Gruber ex rel. Gruber
v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serys., 91 Fed. Cl. 773, 792 (2010) (noting that "it is generally
accepted that an attorney may assist a medical expert by ... conducting research for the expert, or
even by drafting portions of [the expert's] report" in complex litigation).
90. See, e.g., Rodgers, 2017 WL 979100, at *7 (applying a totality of the circumstances test);
see also Reber v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. 2:14-CV-2694, 2017 WL 3888351, at *4, *6, *7 (S.D.
Ohio Sept. 6, 2017) (predicating exclusion on a variety of factors); Patent Category Corp. v. Target
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involvement make it easier for the court to conclude that the report
should be stricken, and the expert precluded from testifying.
2. Cases in Which Lawyer Assistance Is on the Line but
Permissible
Another class of cases worth considering are those that find the
lawyer's conduct close to the line, but insufficiently improper to warrant
striking the expert report and excluding the expert's testimony. 91 Most
courts, while not endorsing the conduct, allow the testimony but note
that the conduct does compromise the expert's credibility which the trier
of fact may take into account in evaluating the weight to be given to the
expert's opinion. 9 2 In short, there remains a constraint on lawyer
assistance, but one less severe than a total rejection of the expert and the
report. Lawyers assisting experts at the line of permissibility will have to
assess whether the benefits of their substantial assistance outweigh the
risk to credibility such assistance may create. 93
The cases themselves share similarities with those where the
lawyer's assistance was found impermissible. For example, in one case,
counsel drafted an outline of the report before engaging with the
expert. 9 4In others, the expert's report bore a striking resemblance to the
Corp., CV 06-7311 CAS (CWx), 2008 WL 11336468, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2008) (predicating
exclusion on a variety of factors); In re Jackson, 2000WL 33654070, at *1 (predicating exclusion
on a variety of factors).
91. See, e.g., Accentra Inc. v. Staples, Inc., No. CV 07-5862 ABC (RZx), 2010 WL
11459205, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2010) (describing the facts before it as presenting "a close call");
McClellan, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (finding conduct "approaches the outer limits of acceptable
assistance"); Howard v. Abdellatif, No. 2:05-cv-81, 2008 WL 5130109, at *1 (W.D. Mich. July 17,
2008) (finding lawyer input "may approach the limits" of what is acceptable); Lehman Bros.
Holdings v. Laureate Realty Servs., Inc., No. 1:04-cv-1432-RLY-TAB, 2007 WL 2265199, at *3
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 2007) (finding that the lawyer's conduct "straddles the line between attorney
assistance and unauthorized attorney preparation of the report"); Crowley v. Chait, 322 F. Supp. 2d

530, 544-45 (D.N.J. 2004) (noting that lawyer's involvement "may approach the limits" of what is
allowable).
92. See, e.g., McClellan, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (finding that the lawyer's role in drafting the
expert's report "approaches the outer limits of acceptable assistance" but did not warrant exclusion
of the expert's testimony, though "it may undermine its weight and credibility"); Mack v.

AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., 671 F. Supp. 2d 706, 712 (D. Md. 2009) (recognizing that "expert
testimony that has been influenced by a hiring attorney is often afforded less deference by a factfinder"); Howard, 2008 WL 5130109, at *1 (commenting that although exclusion was not justified,
the degree of lawyer assistance, which approached the limits of what is allowed, "may be fertile
ground for cross-examination").
93. See generally Mannix, supra note 1 (noting that "[e]ven innocent and non-leading

involvement can be spun by an effective adversary as coaching of the witness, which is likely to
repulse the jury" and that "[a]t a minimum, the attorney will be placed in the unenviable position of
trying to convince the jury that the expert's opinions were not improperly influenced").

94. Accentra, 2010 WL 11459205, at *5 (finding that although counsel prepared an outline
for the report before the first meeting with the expert, the expert "was involved enough"
subsequently to have "prepared" the document, even though the degree of input rendered the case a
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reports of other experts. 5 What distinguishes these cases from those in
the previous section is that in each there was evidence that the experts
involved did in fact play a substantial role in the creation of the reports. 9 6
In calling these "close" cases, the courts implicitly were questioning the
nature and extent of the lawyer's involvement, but ultimately felt the
true focus should be on the expert's conduct. The ultimate question is
whether the expert "prepared" the report within the meaning of Rule
26(a)(2). The degree of lawyer involvement is only relevant to the extent
it undercuts the argument that the expert was sufficiently involved so as
to be seen as preparing the report. 97 In these cases the experts'
substantial input was shown.9 8
EXCLUSION AND CREDIBILITY DIMINUTION TO CONTROL LAWYER

III.

ASSISTANCE IN THE CREATION OF EXPERT REPORTS

Two remedies are usually raised to control excessive lawyer
involvement in the preparation of expert reports. Where the assistance is
extreme, the report and testimony by the expert may be excluded. Even
if the lawyer's contribution to the expert witness report is not so
extensive as to warrant its exclusion, the lawyer's participation still may
undercut the credibility the trier of fact will give to the expert's opinion.
In numerous instances, courts have found this a sufficient backstop to
lawyer overreaching such that substantial lawyer involvement will
be allowed.

close one).

95. See, e.g., McClellan, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 1118, 1127 (allowing in report, despite the fact
that report of two experts were similar if not identical, where expert "conducted his study and
formulated his opinion prior to his retention as an expert," reviewed and edited the draft, and at
deposition "adopted the substance of his report and explained the basis for his opinion"); Howard
2008 WL 5130109, at *1 (finding that although counsel drafted reports for two experts that were
"virtually identical," exclusion of the report was not required since the expert "reviewed substantial
documentation provided to him before formulating his opinion, discussed his opinion 'numerous
times' with defense counsel before signing an expert report, and reviewed the final expert report

'from beginning to end' before signing the report"); Lehman, 2007 WL 2265199, at *3 (denying
exclusion, despite the fact that lawyer provided witness with a template based on the report of
another expert tailored to suit the instant case, where expert was unaware of the origin of the

template, had previously reviewed relevant documents and shared his opinions prior to receiving the
template, and subsequently made modifications to the template and embraced the opinions as his
own).

96. See Accentra, 2010 WL 11459205, at *5; McClellan, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 1127; Howard,
2008 WL 5130109, at *1; Lehman, 2007 WL 2265199, at *2, *3.
97.

See supra note 71

98. It is unclear the extent to which these courts are simply evaluating similar conduct
differently, finding it not quite as improper as exclusion courts, or whether the facts involved are
slightly less egregious than those in cases where exclusion is imposed. See supra note 91
(discussing lawyer involvement in the preparation of expert reports at the edge of propriety).
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Exclusion ofReport and Testimony

In this area, the usual argument is that the lawyer's assistance was
so extensive that the expert did not "prepare" the report, as the Federal
Rules require, and therefore it should be excluded. Two different
vehicles are used to justify exclusion. One is from the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure themselves. The other is from the Federal Rules of
Evidence. At times the courts employ both devices. 99
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1),
[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as
required by Rule 26(a) or (e) the party is not allowed to use that
information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or
at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.
Where attorney assistance is too broad under the prevailing
standard, the expert is seen as not having "prepared" the expert witness
report as Rule 26(a)(2)(B) mandates and, hence, has not provided the
information that rule requires. While justification or the harmlessness of
the conduct will undercut the exclusion remedy, this often cannot
be shown.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides another vehicle for
exclusion. Under that provision, expert testimony is allowed only if it is
reliable. 10 0An expert report that merely parrots the lawyer's input is not
the sort of expert testimony we would deem reliable as it is not the work
of a qualified expert. 10 As one party argued, "if the opinions in the
expert reports are not actually the opinions of the experts, then the report
fails to satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 702 because the report

99. The cases in this area do not address the real-world differences, if any, that stem from the
approach taken.
100. See, e.g., Cantrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. CIV 12-0129 KBM/SMV, 2013 WL 8632378, at
*2, *3-7 (D.N.M. June 28, 2013) (noting that Rule 702 requires a two-step analysis-that the expert
is qualified and that the opinion rendered is reliable and helpful); see also Inventio AG v.
Thyssenkrupp Elevator Americas Corp., No. 08-874-RGA, 2014 WL 174301, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 14,
2014) (applying a 702 analysis to analyze the propriety of lawyer assistance in preparing an expert
report).
101. See, e.g., Cantrell, 2013 WL 8632378, at *2-7; EEOC v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 60 F.
Supp. 2d 791, 794-97 (N.D. 111. 1999) (excluding expert's report under Daubert where, among other
things, the expert overly relied on assistance of counsel); Joel S. Feldman, et al., Expert Witnesses in
InsuranceClass Actions and Individual Cases Defense Perspective, SF50 A.L.I.-ABA 278-79, 28085 (2000) ("Thus, if counsel drafts an expert's report without substantial input from the expert, the
opinions in that report cannot be considered reliable because they are not the opinions of the expert.
Likewise, if an expert writes a report simply to appease counsel or the party paying the expert, that
too is not a reliable underpinning for his opinions, and the likely result would be exclusion of the
report.").
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must be based on the expert's own valid reasoning and methodology to
be admissible."l0 2
B.

CredibilityDiminution

Often, however, courts, while questioning the extent of lawyer
involvement, find exclusion too harsh a remedy.10 3 Although the report
is allowed in discovery, and the expert is allowed to testify in a
subsequent trial, 10 4the credibility of the report and testimony may be
affected by the lawyer's role. This can occur at two levels. At the most
basic, the expert must ultimately defend his testimony. If the expert is
little more than a conduit for the lawyer's views, the expert may be
unable to defend her report effectively. That, in turn, will diminish its
impact. In addition, proof of excessive lawyer involvement may
undercut the degree the trier of fact will credit the testimony. It will be
clear it is less a product of applied expertise of a well-qualified expert
and more the advocacy of a lawyer who lacks the substantive expertise
that supports giving weight to such testimony. As one court described it:
"[A]n expert who can be shown to have adopted the attorney's opinion
as his own stands less tall before the jury than an expert who has
engaged in painstaking inquiry and analysis before arriving at
an opinion.""os

102. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Societe d'Exploitation Section du Solitaire, S.A., No. 051295, 2007 WL 2712936, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2007).
103. See, e.g., Harmon v. United States, No. PX 15-2611, 2017 WL 4098742, at *9 (D. Md.
Sept. 15, 2017) (noting that "while it may be ill-advised for an attorney to take such an active role in
drafting the Rule 26 report, the extreme sanction of exclusion is not warranted" where attorney
drafted two virtually identical reports which the experts adopted without revision); Patent Category
Corp. v. Target Corp., No. CV 06-7311 CAS (CWx), 2008 WL 11336468, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 17,
2008) (noting that exclusion "is seldom appropriate," although finding it so on the facts before the
court).
104. In one case, the court allowed the expert report to stand and the expert to testify despite
finding that much of the testimony was outside the expert's expertise, was drafted primarily by
counsel and amounted to "a legal brief or a patent law seminar [which is] neither normal nor
proper." KNAPP Logistics & Automation, Inc. v. RIX Automation Sols., Inc., No. 14-cv-00319RBJ, 2015 WL 5608124, at *1-2 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2015). Instead the court admonished counsel,
I need not go through his 62-page report line by line and coach counsel as to what Dr.
Derby can and cannot do, nor do I need to review his supplemental report. ECF No. 1521. Counsel surely gets the drift and, since they hope to be effective advocates at trial,
they will conform their questioning of Dr. Derby to the letter and spirit of this order.
Otherwise, they are in for repeated interruptions of testimony, exclusions of testimony,
and admonitions from the Court.
Id. at *2.
105. Occulto v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 125 F.R.D. 611, 616 (D.N.J. 1989).
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PROOF OF THE DEGREE OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE IN THE
CREATION OF EXPERT REPORTS

As we have seen, excessive lawyer assistance in the preparation of
expert reports is cabined both by exclusion of the expert's testimony, at
the extreme, and by the threat that lawyer conduct once exposed will
undercut the credibility of the expert's testimony. But how does one
create a record of lawyer involvement such that exclusion can be ordered
or credibility undercut? The problem is exacerbated by burden of proof
issues as the party seeking exclusion of the expert report bears the
burden of showing excessive lawyer involvement,1 06 yet the information
necessary to show so is largely in the hands of the opponent.
A.

The 2010 Amendments to the Expert Discovery Rules
and Their Impact

When the expert report was added to the Rules in 1993,107 this was
a relatively easy task. The drafters contemplated that draft reports would
be discoverable as would material shared by the lawyer with the
expert.' 0 Comparing drafts might show changes originating from the
lawyer. 0 9 The lawyer's written suggestions would be known and oral

106. This is true if exclusion is sought under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,
Long-Term Capital Holdings, LP v. United States, No. 01-CV-1290(JBA), 2003 WL 21269586, at
*4 (D. Conn. May 6, 2003); Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 295 (E.D. Va. 2001);
accord Seitz v. Envirotech Sys. Worldwide Inc., No. H-02-4782, 2008 WL 656513, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 6, 2008) (citing Long-Term CapitalHoldings, 2003 WL 21269586, at *4; Trigon, 204 F.R.D.
at 295). However, if noncompliance is shown and the question becomes whether it will be excused
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, the burden is on the party seeking to avoid exclusion.
See, e.g., Weekes v. Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp., No. 1:10-cv-566-BLW, 2011 WL 6140967,
at *5 (D. Idaho Dec. 9, 2011). In contrast, if exclusion is premised on Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
the party proffering the expert has the burden of showing that the expert's testimony meets the
Dauberttest for admission. See The Daubert Standard:A Guide to Motions, Hearings, andRulings,
EXPERT INST. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/the-daubert-standard-a-guide-tomotions-hearings-and-rulings (noting that "[o]nce a Daubert motion is filed, the party seeking to
admit the testimony bears the burden of proof and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the expert possesses the requisite level of expertise and the testimony is based on reliable
methodologies").
107. FED. R. Civ.P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
108. As the Advisory Committee noted when adopting the expert report requirement, "litigants
should no longer be able to argue that materials furnished to their experts to be used in formulating
their opinions-whether or not ultimately relied upon the expert-are privileged or otherwise
protected from disclosure when such persons are testifying or being deposed." Id.
109. This was a common approach prior to 2010 when such information was most often
discoverable. See, e.g., EEOC v. UPS, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1138-40 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (providing
the expert's testimony diminished credibility in part because upon reviewing drafts of the expert's
report it revealed substantial changes had been made, all at the suggestion of counsel), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. 306 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 311 F.3d
1132 (9th Cir. 2002); W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2000 WL
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input could be explored. While the federal courts were not unanimous in
reading the rule to require disclosure of all lawyer work-product shared
with the testifying expert, that was clearly the majority view.'
Transparency was seen as the best method to both allow lawyer
assistance and keep it within sensible bounds. Transparency would work
as both a deterrent and a protection. Lawyers would cabin their
involvement knowing it might well be discovered."' To the extent
lawyers nevertheless exceed permissible bounds, discovery could
uncover that behavior, subjecting the lawyer to reputational
consequences
and the expert's testimony to exclusion or
credibility impairment.
By 2010, the drafters noted a growing concern by the Bar that
transparency had its own costs, costs that outweighed its alleged
advantages. 1 12 The argument against the transparency regime was
several-fold. First, was an argument that there was no quantifiable
evidence that transparency achieved its desired result." That, however,
1843258, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000) (noting from seeing lawyer input on drafts that while some
changes were matters of form others were substantive thus "rais[ing] an issue of the extent to which
[the expert] final report represents [the expert's] own product or that of Defendant's attorneys");
Marek v. Moore, 171 F.R.D. 298, 302 (D. Kan. 1997).
110. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment (indicating that
"many" courts held this view); Tanis et al., supra note 18 (noting that "[u]nder the 1993 version of
Rule 26(a)(2)(B), most courts held that everything disclosed to and considered by an expert witness
was discoverable," (citing inter alia Reg'1 Airport Auth. of Louisville v. LFG, LLC, 460 F.3d 697,
717 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that "the overwhelming majority of courts" had adopted a "a bright-line
rule mandating disclosure of all documents, including attorney opinion work product, given to
testifying experts"))).
111. Easton Letter, supra note 61, at 13 (stressing the deterrent effect of transparency); Letter
from 37 Law Professors, supra note 21, at 2 (stressing the deterrent effect of transparency).
112. See, e.g., COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 10-11 (2009). Numerous

organizations, collectively representing a wide-range of those involved in the civil litigation
process, supported the amendments. Among them were the American Bar Association, the Council
of the American Bar Association Section on Litigation, the American College of Trial Lawyers, the
American Association for Justice, the Federal Magistrate Judges' Association, the Lawyers for Civil
Justice, the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, the International Association of Defense
Counsel, and the United States Department of Justice. Id. Expert witness groups, such as the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, also weighed-in in favor of the proposal. See,
e.g., Letter from Patrice Schiano, Chair, Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants's ("AICPA")
Forensic & Litig. Serv. Comm., and Thomas E. Hilton, Chair, AICPA's Forensic & Valuation Serv.
Exec. Comm., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y for the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the U.S. 2 (Feb. 17, 2009). A notable exception was the input of law
professors, many of whom had trial and expert witness experience, who opposed the amendments.
See, e.g., Easton Letter, supra note 61, passim; Letter from 37 Law Professors, supra note 21.
113.

A major impetus for the rule revision was a report and resolution from the ABA to limit

the discovery of drafts and attorney-expert communications. In the report, the American Bar
Association noted that there was "no evidence, empirical or otherwise" supporting open discovery
of such communication as being superior to the more limited discovery approach. See, e.g., Am.
BAR.

ASS'N, SECTION

OF LITIGATION,

DISCOVERABILITY OF EXPERT REPORTS 7
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was a bit of a makeweight as there also was no empirical evidence that it
did not.1 1 4Second, there was an ad hominem attack that the transparency
approach was the product of academic theoreticians not grounded in the
real world of practice.' 1 5 More powerful was the critique of what was
actually happening on the ground-lawyers and experts adapted to the
transparency regime in several ways. It became common for the parties
to agree not to inquire about draft reports or lawyer involvement in the
creation of the expert report.1 1 6 Where this was unavailable, experts
ceased creating written drafts of their reports and elaborate processes
were put in place to avoid creating a paper trail of the lawyer's input."'
The primary impetus for this behavior was to protect opinion work
product from discovery.1
In addition, it was alleged that much of discovery turned not on the
merits of the expert's report and the expert's ability to defend that report
but rather on the process of preparation itself and the lawyer's role in
it. 1 1 9 Those who objected to transparency found such inquiries a costly
exercise that seldom bore fruit.1 2 0 In short, transparency was thwarted
when it could be, and when it could not, little was gained by shedding
light on the lawyer-expert collaborative process.121
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/litigation/standards/docs/120areport.authc
heckdam.pdf. This recommendation led to an ABA resolution in support of such discovery limits.
See AM. BAR ASS'N, RESOLUTION

120A, DISCOvERABILITY

OF EXPERT REPORTS

(2006),

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/litigation/standards/docs/120a_policy.pdf
114. See generally AM. BAR As'N, supra note 113, at 7 (noting only that "there is no
empirical evidence of which we are aware that disclosure of draft expert reports and attorney-expert
communications has improved the quality ofjustice, or that without that disclosure, counsel or the
trier of fact has been hindered in the ability to test the merits of an expert's opinion.").
115.

See, e.g., COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 112, at 13 (noting

opposition to the amendments by academics, but finding their concerns "not borne out by the
practitioners' experience"); CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., DRAFT MINUTES 18 (Sept. 7-8, 2006),

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/defaultfiles/fr import/CV09-2006-min.pdf (summarizing testimony
of ABA representative that those who favored open disclosure "tend to be judges and professors not
involved in daily expert-witness practice," deriding their views as mere "theory").
116.

See, e.g., COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 112, at 12

(acknowledging that under the 1993 discovery regime "[m]any experienced lawyers routinely
stipulate[d]" to such limitations).
117. See, e.g., id. at 10-11; see also David Herr & Steve Baicker-McKee, Expert DisclosuresReview ofthe Expert's File-Role ofCounsel in the DraftingProcess, FED. LITIGATOR, June 2013, at

15 (describing several of the common steps taken to avoid creating a paper trail of lawyer-expert
interaction).
118. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE& PROCEDURE, supra note 112, at 10, 11.

119. Seeid.at11-12.
120. See id. at 10-13 (arguing that exploration into the lawyer's role in preparing the expert
report was "rarely successful" and "was time-consuming and expensive").
121. A related concern was that lawyers were forced to hire two sets of experts, one set being
non-testifying experts with whom conversation was largely immune from discovery and testifying
experts subject to the open-discovery regime. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's

note to 2010 amendment. With greater protection from discovery, one expert could be used for both
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In response, the drafters added restrictions on discovery in this
area. 12 2 First, the rule extends work product protection to all lawyer
communications with testifying experts except those that relate to expert
witness compensation, "facts or data"1 23 considered,1 24 or "assumptions"
relied upon by the expert. 12 5 If a communication contains both
information falling within the three exceptions,1 26 and some that does

testifying and consultative purposes.
122. For a discussion of some of the case law interpreting these restrictions, see 3 Bus.& COM.
LITIG. FED. CTS. §29:10 (4th ed. 2018).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). The Advisory Committee Note states that the phrase "facts
or data" should be "interpreted broadly" to include any material "that contains factual ingredients."
FED. R. Ctv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment. To the extent facts and data are
provided by an attorney, disclosure in discovery is required "only [as] to communications
'identifying' the facts or data provided by counsel; further communications about the potential

relevance of the facts or data are protected." Id. The drafters also made clear that the phrase "facts
or data" is narrower than the previously used phrase "data or other information" and does not
encompass theories or mental impressions of counsel. Id; see also Carpenter v. Deming Surgical
Assocs., Civ. No. 14-64 JCH/SCY, 2015 WL 13662880, at *3 (D.N.M. Apr. 20, 2015) (noting that
"mere stylistic edits are not discoverable communications pursuant to the facts, data, or assumptions
exceptions, as [the expert] did not consider or rely on them in forming his opinion"). Whether this
distinction between "facts and data" and other information can be clearly ascertained is open to
debate. See, e.g., William H. Gussman Jr., Amended Expert Discovery Rules One Year Later:Has

Anything Changed?, N.Y.L.J., Jan 18, 2012, at 4, 4-5 (arguing that "[a]lmost any communication
between an attorney and an expert could arguably contain a 'fact' or an 'assumption"' and
recommending that lawyers "continue to be cautious in working with testifying experts, mindful

that just about anything shared with a testifying expert may still be fair game in discovery"). To
lessen this concern, it has been suggested as a best practice that lawyers seek to separate
communications of fact and data from those containing mental impressions and theories in order to
minimize any confusion. Robert J. Liubicic, Expert Q&A on the Rule 26 Amendments: Developing
Case Law, PRAC. L.J. LrrIG., Feb.-Mar. 2014, at 23.

124. As one court held with regard to material sent to testifying experts, the term "considered"
should be interpreted broadly to require "disclosure of all information a testifying expert generates,
reviews, reflects upon, reads, and/or uses in connection with the formulation of his opinions, even if
such information is ultimately rejected." In re Benicar (Olmesartan) Prods. Liab. Litig., 319 F.R.D.
139, 141 (D.N.J. 2017) (quoting Synthes Spine Co. v. Walden, 232 F.R.D. 460, 463 (E.D. Pa.
2005)); accord Millsaps Coll. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 3:16CV193-C'WR-LRA, 2017 WL
3158879, at *3 (S.D. Miss. July 24, 2017) (quoting In re Benicar, 319 F.R.D. at 141). This is true
even if the expert testifies that she did not "consider" the information. E.g., In re Commercial
Money Ctr., Inc., Equip. Lease Litig., 248 F.R.D. 532, 537 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (noting that "experts
have been deemed to have considered materials even when they have testified, under oath, that they
did not consider the materials in forming their opinions"); accord Wellin v. Farace, No. 2:16-cv-

00414-DCN, 2018 WL 7247056, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 5, 2018), report and recommendation adopted
sub nom. No. 2:16-cv-0414 DCN, 2019 WL 466461 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2019).
125. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(ii). The phrased "relied upon" is narrower than the term
"considered." It "means that the expert's opinion depended upon the assumptions provided by the

attorney." Johnson v. City of Rockford, No. 15 CV 50064, 15 CV 50065, 2018 WL 1508482, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2018).
126.

To the extent a lawyer's communication to the expert falls into one of the three exceptions

to work-product protection, must the communication itself be produced in response to an
appropriate discovery request? Federal Rule 26 eliminates work-product protection for
"communications" containing certain kinds of information which suggests that the communications
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not, the protected information will be redacted and the remainder
disclosed. 12 7Second, the Rule provides work product protection for
drafts of expert witness reports, 12 8unless a draft is used by the lawyer to
convey facts or data to be considered or assumptions ultimately relied
upon by the expert. 2 9
themselves can be discovered. See, e.g., Windowizards, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., No. 137444, 2015 WL 1402352, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2015) (requiring disclosure of the documents
through which facts and data were communicated by the lawyer to the expert); United States v.
Veolia Env't N. Am. Operations, Inc., No. 13-mc-03-LPS, 2014 WL 5511398, at *5, *6, *7 (D. Del.
Oct. 31, 2014), amended by No. 13-mc-03-LPS, 2014 WL 6449973 (D. Del. Nov. 17, 2014)
(requiring disclosure of the documents through which facts and data were communicated by the
lawyer to the expert); Fialkowski v. Perry, No. 11-5139, 2012 WL 2527020, at *1, *5 (E.D. Pa.
June 29, 2012) (requiring disclosure of the documents through which facts and data were
communicated by the lawyer to the expert). Simply identifying the underlying information is
insufficient. But cf Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc. v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl. 584, 591 (2016)
(implying that the provision in the expert report of the list of facts and data considered is sufficient
to "probe and test" the expert's opinion and that further discovery would therefore not be
necessary); Kurt A. Philipps, Jr. et al., 6 KY. PRAC. R. Cv. PROC. ANN., Rule 26.02 (West 2019)
(arguing that only the facts considered or the assumptions relied upon need to be disclosed rather
than the documents themselves).
127. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., No. 3:16 CV 224, 2018 WL 4957290, at
*6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2018); Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ., No. 3:08-CV-00441 (TLM), 2011 WL
1935865, at *2 (D. Conn. May 19, 2011); FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2010
amendments (noting that if a communication contains both protected and unprotected material "the
protection applies to all other aspects of the communication beyond the excepted topics"); see also
In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 2:03-cv-01431-RCJ-PAL, 2017 WL
2991347, at *7, *8, *10 (D. Nev. July 12, 2017) (holding that evidence notebooks prepared by
counsel and relied upon by the expert do not have to be disclosed where underlying documents it
contained had been disclosed and that producing notebooks which showed counsel's excerpting,
organizing, and commenting on those documents would reveal lawyer mental impressions);
8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2016.5 (3d ed. 2010)
(stating "where the documents reviewed by the witness have already been produced, there is no
justification for requiring revelation by counsel of the exact identity or sequence of materials
actually reviewed").
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). A distinction has arisen, however, between expert notes,
which are discoverable, and draft expert reports which are not. For a thoughtful decision providing
guidance on how to draw this distinction, see Wenk v. O'Reilly, No. 2:12-cv-474, 2014 WL
1121920, passim (S.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2014); see also In re Application of Republic of Ecuador, 280
F.R.D. 506, 512, 513 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (distinguishing notes, task lists, outlines, memoranda,
presentations, and draft letters from draft reports); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No.
MDL 875, 2011 WL 6181334, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2011) (finding that expert's notes do not
constitute drafts within the meaning of the rule). While the rule explicitly protects drafts of expert
reports, it is not limited to reports written by experts. If the lawyer provides a draft of the report as
part of the process, it also is protected unless it conveys material subject to discovery under Rule
26(b)(4)(C). See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, 319 F.R.D. 498, 510-11
(N.D. Tex. 2016).
129. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wall, 319 F.R.D. at 509 ("Accordingly, reading Rule
26(b)(4) to require disclosure of those portions of a draft expert report transmitted between an
attorney and an expert that identify facts, data, or assumptions provided by an attorney-even
though the vehicle of communication between the attorney and the expert was a draft of a report or
an attorney's revision to the expert's draft-does not undermine the purpose behind providing
work-production protection to draft reports or render Rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s extension of work-product
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By limiting the information available to an adversary, it makes it
harder for the adversary to prove the level of lawyer assistance in order
to determine its propriety or the impact it should be accorded by the trier
of fact."o As one author described it, if one cannot discover draft reports
and most lawyer-expert communications, "what will stop attorneys from
ghost-writing reports in violation of the rule?"131 Another
author cautioned:
Recent rule changes even preclude discovery of interactions between
lawyers and hired gun experts. This rule change permits attorneys to
secretly coach highly paid witnesses and coordinate a tailored opinion
with little or no fear that opposing attorneys or the jury will ever learn
of the attorney's suggestions or rewrites.1 32
To understand this new world of expert discovery and the degree
discovery is limited, one needs to explore the motivations for the
restrictions imposed.1 3 3 One concern was that inquiries into the role
protection to drafts a nullity. The discovery authorized by the Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(ii)-(iii) exceptions
does not extend beyond the specific topics listed in the exceptions. The remainder of any draft
report would be covered as work-product under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) and, for that matter, insofar as it is
transmitted between the attorney and the expert, Rule 26(b)(4)(C)."); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Newell, 301 F.R.D. 348, 353 (N.D. 111. 2014) ("Arguably, facts, data or assumptions
provided by an attorney to the expert should not be insulated from production simply because the
vehicle of communication was a draft of the report or an attorney's revision to the expert's draft.");
Mitchell, 2018 WL 4957290, at *5 ("although draft reports are typically entitled to protection, to the
extent those drafts were how Plaintiffs attorneys communicated the 'facts or data' or 'assumptions'
on which [the expert] relied, such drafts would be discoverable."); Bingham v. Baycare Health Sys.,
No. 8:14-cv-73-T-23JSS, 2016 WL 5106946, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2016); In re Asbestos
Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 WL 6181334, at *7 n.10 (endorsing the view that protecting facts or data
considered by a retained expert by providing some in a draft report would be disfavored as an
"obvious loophole").
130. See, e.g., Newell, 301 F.R.D. at 352 (The CFTC's approach would require an analysis of
the degree of counsel involvement (both quantity and quality) in the drafting of the report ....
[which] would necessarily require production of all of the drafts of the report for comparison, as
well as production of all, or virtually all, communications between expert and counsel. The drafters
intended Rule 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) to protect against that discovery."); Goodness Films, LLC v. TV
One, LLC, No. CV 12-08688-GW (JEMx), 2013 WL 12136374, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013)
(rejecting, as inconsistent with the purpose of the 2010 amendments, a party request for production
of an expert's draft report in order to determine the extent of lawyer involvement).
131. Stuart, supranote 1.
132. Mark I. Bernstein, Jury Evaluation of Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules, 7
DREXEL L. REv. 239, 273 (2015); cf Easton, supra note 1, at 474 n.23 (noting the importance of
production of drafts and other lawyer input to effectively allow the jury to weigh the expert's
credibility against that of other testifying experts); Stephen D. Easton & Franklin D. Romines II,
Dealing with Draft Dodgers: Automatic Production of Drafts of Expert Witness Reports, 22 REv.
LITIG. 355, 359 (2003).
133. As discussed in the text, there were two principal motivations behind the 2010
amendments. One might sensibly construe the amended rules in a way that achieves both goals.
Nevertheless, the cases appear to choose between the two with that choice affecting the
interpretation given to the amended provisions. See infra text accompanying notes 134-37.
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counsel played in the creation of expert reports was too costly and often
provided little of true value in return.1 34 If that is the primary motivation,
then discovery of the role played by the lawyer should be

highly limited."'
Another motivation was a desire to allow lawyers to speak freely to
experts without fear that their mental impressions, theories of the case,
etc. would be revealed. 1 36 If this concern is the key, then discovery that
does not reveal this information or otherwise inhibit such discussions
might be permissible. As one court wrote: "The bright-line rule
[everything shown to the expert is discoverable] is no longer valid;
attorneys' 'theories or mental impressions' are protected, but everything
else is fair game." 3 7
B. Disagreementover the Means by Which
Lawyer Assistance May Be Discoveredl38
Take, for example, questions about the role the lawyer played in
preparation of the expert's report. If our goal is streamlining the
discovery process in this area, such questions would be impermissible. If
our goal is protecting lawyer mental impressions from discovery,
providing gross information about the lawyer's role (e.g., the lawyer
wrote the first draft after input from the expert) would be permissible.
Questions about who wrote a particular paragraph might be more
problematic as it shows the lawyer's thinking. Then again, actual input

134. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
135. See, e.g., In re Cook Med., Inc., IVC Filters Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1:14-ml-2570-RLY-TAB, 2018 WL 6113466, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2018) (noting that
"[r]equiring a party to produce more [than the information made discoverable under 26(b)(4)(C)]
would directly contravene the purpose of the 2010 amendments to Rule 26 . . . ."); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 301 F.R.D. at 352 (finding that allowing discovery of attorney input
beyond facts and data relied upon would contravene the intent of the 2010 amendments).

136. See, e.g., Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that
"the driving purpose of the 2010 amendments was to protect opinion work product-i.e., attorney
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories-from discovery").

137. Yeda Research & Dev. Co. v. Abbott GMBH & Co. KG, 292 F.R.D. 97, 105 (D.D.C.
2013); accord Johnson v. City of Rockford, No. 15 CV 50064, 2018 WL 1508482, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 27, 2018) (citing Yeda, 292 F.R.D. at 105).
138. The history of the adoption of the 2010 amendments provides no clear answer to this
issue. Judge Mark. R. Kravitz, Chair of the United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, argued strongly that no inquiry into the lawyer's role in
assisting in the preparation of the expert's report would be allowed under the proposed 2010
amendments. He appeared to embrace the extreme position (at least in the case law) that it makes no

difference who drafts the report. If the expert adopts it as her own, that is sufficient; the role of the
lawyer in its preparation is irrelevant. Others disagreed on a variety of grounds. See COMM. ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, STANDING COMM. MINUTES, June 2008, at 34-39 (2008),
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/cornmittee-rules-practice-andprocedure-june-2008.
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as to the report itself often falls within the discoverable categories of
information or data the expert considered or assumptions the expert
relied upon. Once the material is in the report it is clear the expert
considered it and in fact relied upon it.' 3 9 Even if the choice to add the
material reflects the lawyer's legal theories and opinions, they cease to
be such when adopted by the expert. This is just like contention
interrogatories. While the decision as to what contentions to allege is a
lawyerly judgment, knowing which contentions the party has chosen to
assert is discoverable. 14 0
Given these differences, it is not surprising that the case law is
mixed on some fundamental issues.14' For example, is it permissible to
ask the expert what role the lawyer played in the final report or which
paragraphs the lawyer drafted?
Some courts find that it is. 14 2 For example, in Johnson v. City of
Rockford, the parties fought over whether it was proper to inquire about
who drafted which portions of the expert's report. 14 3 When raised at the
expert's deposition, the opposing party instructed the expert not to
answer, claiming such information was work product and therefore
protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(C).'" The court, however, held that that
information was discoverable.1 4 5 The court pointed out that, by raising
the defense, the party was implicitly admitting that the lawyer drafted
portions of the expert's report since the defense raised only protects
attorney/expert communications from disclosure, not communications

139. See, e.g., Johnson, 2018 WL 1508482, at *5 (articulating this analysis); Gerke v.
Travelers Cas. Ins. Co., 289 F.R.D. 316, 328-29 (D. Or. 2013) (arguing that if the expert report
contains analysis provided by the lawyer, it is information considered in forming the opinion-a
communication expressly exempted from work-product protection).
140. See generally FED. R. CV. P. 33(a)(2) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
141. Perhaps because of this, one commentator cautions that even with the 2010 limitations on
expert discovery, while "[1]awyers can take comfort in the protections offered by the rule, . . . they
must still not become complacent." John M. Barkett, DraftExpert Reports and Work Product, NAT.
RES. & EN'T, Fall 2015, at 52, 53.
142. See, e.g., Gerke, 289 F.R.D. at 324, 328; Cantrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. CIV 12-0129
KBM/SMV, 2013 WL 8632378, at *6-7 (D.N.M. June 28, 2013); Lehman Bros. Holdings v.
Laureate Realty Servs., Inc., No. 1:04-cv-1432-RLY-TAB, 2007 WL 2265199, at *2 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 6, 2007); cf GERGACZ, supra note 11, at § 7.55 (arguing that the amended rule limiting
discovery should be narrowly construed to "accommodate the needs ofjustice" which are promoted
by allowing discovery of the expert's role except as explicitly limited by the Rule 26(b)(4)(B) and
(C)).
143. Johnson, 2018 WL 1508482, at *3-5; see also Carpenter v. Deming Surgical Assocs., Civ.
No. 14-64 JCH/SCY, 2015 WL 13662880, at *5 (D.N.M. Apr. 20, 2015) (allowing counsel to
"cross-examine experts about Plaintiffs counsel's involvement in the preparation of their reports");
Gerke, 289 F.R.D. at 324, 329 (allowing lawyer to question expert about who assisted in preparation
of the report, including counsel and who authored particular paragraphs of the report).
144. Johnson, 2018 WL 1508482, at *2-3.
145. Id. at *6-7.
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from others. 1 46 The court then asked the expert to identify, for in-camera
inspection, which portions of the report were written by the attorney. 14 7
That, in turn, allowed the court to analyze which portions of the report
contained facts considered and assumptions relied upon, information
unprotected by the work-product doctrine. 14 8 In a colorful conclusion,
the court explained why such inquiry should be allowed:
The Defendants should be allowed to cross-examine the
Plaintiffs' expert with the fact that somebody else typed portions of his
report. Perhaps the Plaintiffs have a good reason why somebody else
typed portions of Mr. Libby's report. Maybe Mr. Libby's hand was
bitten by a dog, smashed in a car door or had a piano keyboard cover
slammed onto it. If so, then Plaintiffs' counsel will be able to elicit that
fact on redirect examination. Maybe the reason for having somebody
else type portions of Mr. Libby's report is not as good. For example,
maybe Mr. Libby failed to comprehend the Plaintiffs' counsels' belief
of the import of certain facts, data, and assumptions, and,
consequently, counsel decided to include those into the report, lest Mr.
Libby not be able to testify to them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The
charade regarding "preparation" of expert disclosures and reports
contained in Rule 26 surely does not go so far as to allow counsel to
write an expert's report-or portions of it-and then hide that fact
from the jury. Cross examination will allow the jury to determine how
much weight to give to Mr. Libby's opinions.1 4 9
Another argument in favor of disclosure is that the work-product
protection only applies to attorney/expert "communications" and
knowing that the attorney participated in the report's drafting does not
reveal a communication."'o
Further, permitting counsel through
deposition questions to identify the role opposing counsel played in the
146.
147.
148.

Id. at *5 n.2.
Id. at *3.
One could argue that any material in a report written by the lawyer and adopted by the

expert is material relied upon and therefore unprotected by the work-product doctrine. As the court
commented: "Counsel cannot argue that [the expert] did not consider the facts or data or rely upon
the assumptions when this information is contained in the final report." Id. at *5. On the other hand,

if the underlying facts and data and assumptions have already been disclosed, the further
information of how the lawyer reformulated that into testimony may still warrant protection. As the
2010 Advisory Committee's note to Rule 26 provides, "[t]he exception applies only to
communications 'identifying' the facts or data provided by counsel; further communications about
the potential relevance of the facts or data are protected." FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's
note to 2010 amendment; cf WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 127, at § 2016.5 (stating "where the
documents reviewed by the witness have already been produced, there is no justification for

requiring revelation by counsel of the exact identity or sequence of materials actually reviewed").
149. Johnson, 2018 WL 1508482, at *7.
150. Knowing that the lawyer participated in the drafting is one thing. Knowing precisely
which sentences in the report are the lawyer's work, in contrast, certainly reveals a communication.
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creation of the expert report allows a party to uncover the degree of
lawyer involvement while keeping the lawyer-expert communications
themselves protected from discovery."s Allowing such discovery seems
essential if we are to adequately police the boundary between legitimate
assistance of counsel and the impermissible usurpation of the
expert's role.15 2
In contrast, other courts believe inquiry about the lawyer's role in
the authorship of particular portions of a testifying expert's report is off
limits."' They see this as just the sort of time-consuming and costly
inquiry the 2010 amendments concerning discovery of testifying experts
were adopted to avoid. 1 5 4 Arguably, as long as we know the facts and
data considered and the assumptions relied upon, along with the expert's
ability to defend the report, including inquiry about communications
from non-lawyers, that should be sufficient for the trier of fact to

151. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Deming Surgical Assocs., Civ. No. 14-64 JCH/SCY, 2015 WL
13662880, at *5 (D.N.M. Apr. 20, 2015) (finding that the availability of deposition examination
about the lawyer's role obviates the need for the communications themselves).
152. See David Herr & Steve Baicker-McKee, supra note 117, at 21-22 (advocating that rule
should be read "to allow opposing counsel to explore during the deposition who wrote which parts
of the expert report.. . . [so that], at trial, counsel can argue to the jury either that opposing counsel
drafted the expert report or that the expert cannot even identify which parts the expert drafted and
which parts counsel drafted").
153. See, e.g., In re Cook Med., Inc., IVC Filters Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1:14-ml-2570-RLY-TAB, 2018 WL 6113466, at *4-5 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2018) (prohibiting
inquiry into who typed which portions of the expert's report as beyond the limited discovery
allowed under Rule 26(b)(4)(B)); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Book Dog Books, LLC, No. 13cv816,
2015 WL 5022545, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2015) (holding that question posed to expert, and
objected to by counsel, as to whether counsel wrote report "runs afoul of the 2010 Amendments to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) and (C)," but that inquiry about input by others is permissible);
Medicines Co. v. Mylan Inc., No. 11-cv-1285, 2013 WL 2926944, at *3, *5 (N.D. Ill. June 13,
2013) (upholding counsel's objection at deposition to questions about the authorship of the expert's
report); see also1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND
COMMENTARY § V, Rule 26 (2019) (arguing that allowing "discovery into the role that the lawyer
played in the development of the expert's opinions.. . . would undermine the whole purpose of the
amendment, which is to allow lawyers to freely and openly interact with their retained experts");
Easton Letter, supra note 61, at 6 (fearing that "[u]nder the amended Rule 26, some might consider
it improper to ask the expert about the extent of [the lawyer's] influence"). One case goes even
further by prohibiting questions asking as a general matter whether the expert relied upon
assumptions provided by the attorney. Sarkees v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 17-CV651V, 2019 WL 1375088, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019). However, the exact import of the case
is unclear in that it seems to allow such questions if they are directed to each specific opinion
expressed rather than to the report as a whole. Id. And, it can be read to suggest that even the
general question might be relevant if other evidence suggested that such reliance had taken place but
was not otherwise disclosed. Id.
154. See, e.g., In re Cook, 2018 WL 6113466, at *4-5 (finding the question of whether one
might depose the expert as to who typed which portions of the final report a "closer question," but
ultimately determining the inquiry improper since "the 2010 amendments to Rule 26 sought to end
extensive and burdensome discovery into communications between counsel and testifying experts").
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evaluate the testimony. 1 5 5 Implicit in this approach is acceptance of
substantial lawyer participation in the expert report's creation, or at least
a reluctance to police it. 1 56 This "Don't Ask; Don't Tell" approach can
be seen as a sub rosa way to decide the permissible degree of lawyer
involvement-i.e. anything goes. While there may be ramifications to
unbridled lawyer involvement in the expert's report preparation, such as
an expert being unable to support the report on examination, the degree
of lawyer involvement itself would be irrelevant.
A third position, in between the first two, would condition the
scope of discovery on the extent to which other information points to the
possibility of substantial lawyer involvement in the preparation of an
expert's report. 1 7 The degree of involvement that would have to be
shown to open up discovery is unclear, but it must be more than mere
speculation that the lawyer was excessively involved.15 Nevertheless,
indirect indicia could be used to suggest substantial lawyer involvement
which may trigger further discovery.1 5 9 For example, one may scrutinize
the time records of the expert "as evidence of the amount of effort that
155. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment; cf Bogosian
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating, in a case predating the current Federal
Rule, that "[e]xamination and cross-examination of the expert can be comprehensive and effective
on the relevant issue ofthe basis for an expert's opinion without an inquiry into the lawyer's role in
assisting with the formulation of the theory").
156. Cf In re Cook, 2018 WL 6113466, at *34 (disallowing inquiry into whether the lawyer
prepared portions the report even in the face of substantial circumstantial evidence that the lawyer
did so).
157. See, e.g., Gerke v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 289 F.R.D. 316, 328 (D. Or. 2013)
(allowing expanded discovery of lawyer-expert communication "when the record reveals the lawyer
may have commandeered the expert's function or used the expert as a conduit for his or her own
theories"); see also Sarkees, 2019 WL 1375088, at *6-7 (denying further discovery when "[n]othing
so far suggests that plaintiffs' counsel drafted or significantly edited any part of [expert's] reports,"
suggesting a different outcome if there were); cf Largent, supra note 28, at 3 (noting that in Canada

"[w]here there is a factual foundation supporting a reasonable suspicion that counsel improperly
influenced an expert or their opinion, draft reports and details of communications with counsel will
be producible"). But see In re Cook, 2018 WL 6113466, at *3-4 (finding that even though there was
substantial circumstantial evidence to show that the lawyer played a heavy role in drafting the
expert witness report, discovery is still limited to "the facts and data [the expert] considered and the
assumptions [he] relied on, in accordance with Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(ii) and (iii)").
158. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Deming Surgical Assocs., Civ. No. 14-64 JCH/SCY, 2015 WL
13662880, at *3 (D.N.M. Apr. 20, 2015) (finding "[s]peculation that Plaintiffs counsel may have
influenced the experts' opinions . .. an insufficient basis to overcome the experts' sworn testimony
that the edits simply involved missing billing information, formatting, misspellings, typographical
errors, and organizational changes," reasoning that "[i]f expert-attorney communications were
discoverable any time these communications led to the modification ofan expert report, attorneys

would be discouraged from providing experts with their mental impressions about the clarity,
conciseness, and understandability of the expert reports. This is exactly the type of result the 2010
amendment was intended to avoid.").
159. Those opposing this approach would argue that the indicia suggesting lawyer involvement
are sufficient on their own to undermine the credibility of the expert, so that additional inquiry into
the lawyer's role is unnecessary.
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he/she has devoted to the report."l 60 Where it appears disproportionately
low given the extent of the report provided, it supports an inference that
someone else, probably the lawyer, had a substantial role in its
preparation.1 6 1 The same might be true if the expert is unable to explain
certain language in the report or how he came to his opinion.'6 2
The seminal case endorsing this approach is Gerke v. Travelers
Casualty Insurance Co.' 6 3 A number of courts, however, have strongly
criticized Gerke as being a product of the court's pique at counsel's
conduct of the case" and the court's reliance on case law superseded by
the 2010 amendments to the expert discovery rules.1 6 5 In declining to
follow the decision, these courts have found it inconsistent with the
policies underlying those amendments.1 66
160.

District Court Sanctions Ghostwriting of Expert Reports, AKIN GUMP (Dec. 23, 2014),

https://www.akingump.com/images/content/3/4/v2/34585/District-Court-Sanctions-Ghostwritingof-Expert-Reports.pdf; see also Numatics, Inc. v. Balluff, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 934, 942 (E.D. Mich.
2014).
161. See, e.g. Gerke, 289 F.R.D. at 328 (finding that limited time expert spent on reviewing the
file and writing the report "create[s] a genuine question whether [the expert] came to these
additional opinions and analyses so quickly because they were suggested or given to him by
Plaintiff's counsel").
162. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, 319 F.R.D. 498, 503 (N.D.
Tex. 2016) (party relied on expert's inability to "articulate the methodology that she used" and her
inability to remember what corporate documents she read or how she summarized them to argue
that counsel must have been involved in the preparation of the expert report to a degree that
supported further discovery); see also Stern et al., supra note 18, at 358 (arguing that under
Pennsylvania rule limiting discovery, inquiry about whether an opinion expressed is that of counsel
or the expert is likely to be allowed "if there are terms or phrases that appear in the expert's report
which are more consistent with 'lawyer related' language, as opposed to words more commonly
used by an expert in a given field"); id. at 362 (opining that a question as to whether counsel
supplied certain language should be allowed if the opinion expressed is "completely outside the
expert's area of expertise"). Of course, if this information alone undercuts the credibility of the
expert's report and testimony, one could argue that knowing about the lawyer's involvement in the
process is unnecessary. Cf Medicines Co. v. Mylan Inc., No. 11-cv-1285, 2013 WL 2926944, at *5
(N.D. HI. June 13, 2013) (finding extensive discovery opportunities along with the ability to offer
rebuttal witnesses and to cross-examine the expert sufficient without ordering the expert to disclose
which paragraphs of the report were written by counsel).
163. 289 F.R.D. 316 (D. Or. 2013).
164. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Deming Surgical Assocs., No. CV 14-64 JCH/SCY, 2015 WL
13662880, at *4-5 (D.N.M. Apr. 20, 2015) (noting that "[t]he judge's displeasure with Plaintiffs
counsel's conduct appears to have prompted the court to adopt a parsimonious reading of the work
product protections Rule 26(b)(4) affords to attorney-expert communications"); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Newell, 301 F.R.D. 348, 351 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (noting that the Gerke court "was
dealing with what it concluded was inappropriate behavior of counsel").
165. Commodity Futures Trading Commn, 301 F.R.D. at 351, 352; Carpenter, 2015 WL
13662880, at *5.
166. See, e.g., Carpenter, 2015 WL 13662880, at *5 (holding that Gerke is inconsistent with
"[t]he Advisory Committee comments and the plain language of Rule 26(b)(4)"); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 301 F.R.D. at 352 (holding that "this court respectfully disagrees with
[Gerke's] interpretation of the amendment to that rule"); see also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Book
Dog Books, LLC, No. 13cv816, 2015 WL 5022545, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2015) (approving the
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Assuming we are to open up discovery, the question is how far it
should be extended. At a minimum this might allow questioning the
expert about the lawyer's role. Attempting to get the communications
themselves or draft reports that reflect the lawyer's input may still be a
step too far given their explicit protection from discovery in the
Federal Rules. 16 7
A similar approach is recognized in the 2010 Advisory Committee
Note, that the work product protection given to most lawyer-expert
communication could be overcome by a showing of special need and
undue hardship. 16 8However, the Note also cautions that the instances
where this standard could be met would be rare due to the extensive
discovery already allowed."' In several cases, trial courts have been
cautious about finding special need in the simple desire to enhance
cross-examination and have rejected undue hardship claims because
sufficient information is available through examination of the expert at
a deposition. 7 e
When we cannot even state with certainty what kinds of questions
we can ask, if any, about the role a lawyer has played in the creation of a
testifying expert's report, we have a situation crying out for clarification
in the Federal Rules.

Magistrate Judge's rejection of Gerke as "unpersuasive"); Goodness Films, LLC v. TV One, LLC,
No. CV 12-08688-GW (JEMx), 2013 WL 12136374, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013) (declining to
follow Gerke).
167. Carpenter, 2015 WL 13662880, at *5 (denying discovery of lawyer communications to
the expert as insufficiently necessary since counsel could "cross-examine Plaintiff's experts about
Plaintiff's counsel's involvement in the preparation of their reports").
168.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment (referencing the

availability ofRule 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) to obtain lawyer communications otherwise protected).
169. Id.; see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kraft Foods Inc., 273 F.R.D. 416, 421 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(citing FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment).

170. See, e.g., Powerweb Energy, Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., No. 3:12CV220(WWE), 2014
WL 655206, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb. 20, 2014) ("Preparing for cross examination is not a sufficient
'substantial need' to overcome work-product protection. If it were, every party could compel

documents properly withheld by claiming a need to prepare for cross-examination. This is
especially true where defendants had the opportunity to test the bases of Mr. Burkert's opinions
through deposition testimony."); Medicines Co. v. Mylan Inc., No. 11-cv-1285, 2013 WL 2926944,
at *5 (N.D. Il. June 13, 2013) (rejecting the argument that there was a substantial need to know

about counsel's possible authorship of parts of the expert's report given extensive discovery
otherwise available). But see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Keybank U.S.A., No. 1:01CV62, 2006 WL
543129, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2006) ("[G]iven the inconsistent testimony offered by [the
expert], together with Swiss Re's suggestion that its attorneys drafted the expert reports, Key has a
substantial need for the notes (exchanged between the expert and counsel, as they] are essential to
permit Key to effectively cross-examine [the expert] . . . . [and given the expert's] less than

forthright testimony ...

[Key] has no other means to obtain the information [so that] .... even

assuming the notes are otherwise protected by the work product doctrine, Key is entitled to them

pursuant to Rule 26(b)(3).").
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Best Practicesin an Age ofExcessive Uncertainty

Until that clarification is accomplished, lawyers need to think about
what practices will best prepare experts while avoiding the downside if
the degree of their participation becomes known.II
As the safest course, one author recommends that "experts prepare
their own reports and that attorneys limit involvement to ensuring
compliance." 7 2Others caution that attorneys "not take a significant role
in drafting the report."'7 3 Because of the vulnerability expert credibility
is to attack for over-involvement of attorneys in preparing expert witness
reports, one group of authors advise that an "[e]xpert[] . . . should not
permit counsel to write, significantly alter, or dictate the opinions
expressed in their reports," 1 74 since "[t]he more influence counsel has on
the report, the more vulnerable the expert becomes."
Nevertheless, the law seems to allow greater assistance:
as long as the attorney does not change the substance of the opinion of
the expert witness [and] [a]ny changes ... [are] freely authorized and
adopted by the expert as his or her own, and not merely for some
appeasement or because of intimidation or undue influence by the
party or counsel.1

76

To the extent lawyers decide to take a permissible but significant
role in assisting in the preparation of the expert's report, based on the
case law, the following appears to be the safest advice on providing
substantial
or
of exclusion
the threat
without
assistance
credibility impairment.
The lawyer should get input from the expert before creating a first
draft.' 7 7 This helps show that the underlying opinion is the expert's

171. See, e.g., Tanis et al., supra note 18 (recommending that "[flor now, counsel and experts
would be wise to heed the advice of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants:
'Experts should not rely on the protection of these new amendments to open the floodgate to
unabated communication with retaining counsel. Opposing counsel will continue to retain some
avenues to discover communications between experts and retaining counsel although the Committee
recommended that these avenues be restricted to rare use, for example, due to 'undue hardship.'

Accordingly, as before, it will continue to be important for experts to exercise good judgment and
educate their professional staff as the amendments are implemented').
172.
173.
174.

Stuart, supra note 1.
DistrictCourt Sanctions GhostwritingofExpert Reports, supra note 160.
MANGRAVITI ET AL., supra note 2, at 12.

175. Id at 13.
176. MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, at § 26.23[5].
177. See, e.g., Tindall v. H & S Homes, LLC, No. 5:10-CV-044(CAR), 2012WL 3241885, at
*1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2012) ("The Court is not convinced, however, that counsel's assistance and
involvement in drafting the report is completely prohibited-even if the assistance involves
preparing the entire first draft-so long as there is 'prior, substantive input' from the expert
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rather than the lawyer's which the expert may feel some pressure
to adopt.
The expert should thoroughly review and make changes or
corrections to that first draft. Even if the first draft does a nice job of
capturing the expert's opinion, revision is helpful to show the expert's
continuing involvement in the preparation of her own report."'
Although cost considerations may tempt lawyers and their clients to
limit the time spent on the project by the expert, that may well be
shortsighted. The hours expended should be commensurate with the
task. This provides another factor to show that the expert's involvement
was real and meaningful. 17 9
As in any situation, the expert needs to understand and be able to
support statements made in the report. Where lawyer assistance is
extensive, however, the need for such command of the document is
heightened to fend off attacks that the report is really the product of the
lawyer not the expert. 8 0
V.

EXTERNAL CONTROLS ON EXCESSIVE LAWYERS ASSISTANCE-

PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
Both courts"' and commentatorsl 82 have raised the issue of whether
excessive lawyer assistance poses ethical concerns."'
Arguably,
witness."); Accentra Inc. v. Staples, Inc., No. CV 07-5862 ABC (RZx), 2010 WL 11459205, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2010) (noting the need for expert input before counsel prepares the first draft of
the report); Linq Indus. Fabrics, Inc. v. Intertape Polymer Corp., No. 8:03-CV-528-T-30-MAP,
2004 WL 5575053, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 21, 2004) (finding lawyer assistance acceptable where the
"expert expresses his opinions to counsel before the report is generated and remains involved in the
editing ofthe report"); Manning v. Crockett, No. 95 C 3117, 1999 WL 342715, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May
18, 1999) (stating that "[a]llowing an expert to sign a report drafted entirely by counsel without
prior substantive input from an expert would read the word 'prepared' completely out of the rule").

But cf Accentra Inc., 2010 WL 11459205, at *5 (although finding the conduct approaching the
limits of what Rule 26(a)(2)(B) allows, the lawyer's production of an outline of the report before
meeting with the expert did not require exclusion where the expert subsequently was involved in
preparing the report).

178. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Gunn Trucking, No. 4:07-CV-72-WCL, 2009 WL 2970399, at *2, *4
(N.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2009) (finding the expert was substantially involved in the creation of his
testimony evidenced by his making substantive changes to the lawyer's draft report).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81 (discussing exclusion or credibility impairment
when insufficient time has been spent by the expert in preparing the report).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84 (discussing exclusion or credibility impairment
when expert cannot support statements in the expert report).

181. See, e.g., Numatics, Inc. v. Balluff, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 934, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
(finding counsel's drafting of the expert report for the expert "a remarkable breach of ethics").
182.

See, e.g., MICHAEL CALLAHAN & COLIN NEWBOLD, FAMILY LAW UPDATE

§

3.02[A]

(2018) (noting that "[a] finding by a court of inappropriate participation in an expert's report can
lead to both ethical sanctions and/or non-admittance of the testimony"); Keith A. Call, Ghostbusting

Experts, 28 UTAH B.J., 32, 33 (2015) (noting that "the court's description [of lawyer conduct in the
Numatics case] is hauntingly similar to the ethical rules' prohibition on "conduct that is prejudicial
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discipline through professional conduct rules may provide an alternative
way to police lawyer behavior in assisting experts in the preparation of
their reports. 1 84 As one commentator put it in defending a Pennsylvania
rule that bars the discovery of attorney/expert communication in most
circumstances, "[w]hile the opponents of the current rule fear that
experts would write opinions that are not factually sound and based
solely on what an attorney told the expert to write, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct prevent that improper result."18
That, I believe, is a vain hope. Professional discipline is unlikely to
control the problem for at least two reasons. The first is that it is unclear
that lawyer assistance in preparing an expert's report presents a clear
violation of existing professional ethics rules.' 8 Second, even if the
conduct does violate these rules, it is unlikely it will be robustly
regulated through the disciplinary system.'
To the extent excessive lawyer involvement is likely to hurt one's
client's case by undercutting the credibility of the expert or having the
expert disqualified, engaging in such conduct could violate the duty of
competence.' 8 This concern, however, is more theoretical than real.
Given that some assistance is not only proper but contemplated, and the
fact that the line between permissible and impermissible degrees of
assistance is not clear, most lawyer conduct that is called into question
will simply reflect a judgment call, not a lack of competence."' Further,
unless the excessive involvement violates a clear norm and is done

to the administration ofjustice"); Stuart, supra note1 (raising ethical issues surrounding excessive
attorney assistance in preparing expert reports). See generally Largent, supra note 28.
183. Of course, if the lawyer's assistance results in the creation of false evidence, that
constitutes a particularly egregious violation of one's ethical duties. See generally MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) (prohibiting a lawyer from falsifying evidence or
assisting a witness in doing so); MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013)

(prohibiting a lawyer's "engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation"). Even assistance that produces truthful evidence, however, has been seen to
raise ethical concerns. That is where the ethics implications become less clear.
184. Cf Largent, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that "while the Federal Rules may evolve with
regard to the depth, breadth, scope, and reach of permissible discovery, the obligations the Model
Rules [of Professional Conduct] impose on the attorney remain largely the same and serve as a
guiding light to the shifting 'norms' of federal discovery").
185.

Stern et al., supra note 18, at 355.

186. See supra text accompanying notes 188-96. In this Subpart, I focus on whether excessive
lawyer assistance violates the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. While the Model Rules have
no legal effect, they are just a model promulgated by the ABA, they have had a major influence on
state codes of professional responsibility. As such they are illustrative of the kinds of rules that
might be implicated by such lawyer conduct.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 195-200.
188.

MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013).

189. Cf Largent, supra note 28, at 4 (acknowledging that the point at which lawyer assistance
in the preparation of the expert's report crosses the line and becomes unethical is unclear).
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repeatedly, the matter would likely not be serious enough to draw
disciplinary attention.
A second concern involves the duty of candor to the tribunal. If the
lawyer serves as the unacknowledged author of what is purportedly a
report prepared by the expert, this could constitute "mak[ing] a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal." 9 0 This prohibition extends to
failure to disclose certain information where failing to do so "is the
equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation.""' Producing a report
that is purportedly the expert's work but is actually the lawyer's, might
be seen to violate this provision. This concern has been raised by those
who oppose lawyer ghostwriting of pro se pleadings.19 2 Nevertheless,
given the explicit recognition in the Advisory Committee notes
that lawyers may assist in the creation of expert witness reports,
and given the common knowledge that they do so, it is hard to see
how silence on the extent of that participation creates an
"affirmativemisrepresentation."1 93
To the extent the lawyer's conduct involves "knowingly
disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal" an ethics
violation will be present.1 9 4 But given the present uncertainty about the
line between permissible and impermissible conduct, showing that the
lawyer "knowingly" violated the discovery rules through his assistance
will be a difficult task.1 9 5 That said, if the requirements before a
190. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013)). Such conduct
might also violate Rule 8.4(c)'s prohibition against "engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N

2013). Rule 4.1 prohibits a lawyer from "knowingly" making "a false statement of material fact or
law to a third-person." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). As

discussed in the text, the "knowingly" aspect of the test may be hard to meet. It is also doubtful that
failure to disclose the degree of lawyer involvement constitutes a "material fact" within the meaning
of the rule. But cf ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof' Responsibility, supra note 39, at 2 (defining
"material" as "material to the merits of the litigation"). Applying the ABA definition, knowledge of
the degree of the lawyer's involvement might be material as it potentially affects the credibility of

the expert's testimony.
191.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. [3] (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).

192.
193.

See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 37, at 291-92.
While this is true in the usual case, situations in which the lawyer writes the entire report

and the expert merely signs it might be treated as a violation. Then again there are some courts that

say even this is permissible, in which case nothing misleading has been done. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text. More clearly, if the expert lies about the lawyer's role in a deposition or at trial
in which the lawyer has called the expert to testify and the lawyer does not take reasonable
measures to correct it, the lawyer's lack of action might constitute a violation under Model Rule
3.3(a)(3).
194.
195.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
Cf Largent, supra note 28, at 6 (noting that "in the ever-changing rules that govern

discovery, adherence to the Model Rules, especially MRPC 3.4(c) not to 'knowingly disobey an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid

obligation exists' can be tricky").
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particular tribunal are clear, whether through case law, local rule, or
standing order, failure to follow them might be seen as a violation. The
outcome would depend on how disciplinary authorities construed the
phrase "rules of the tribunal."
To the extent we see such conduct as undermining the role of the
expert as a witness, that may violate the prohibition on "engag[ing] in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."1 9 6 But given
the substantial disagreement as to the proper scope of lawyer
involvement, this would be a stretch.
While there are arguments to treat excessive lawyer assistance in
creating expert witness reports as professional misconduct, it is unlikely
that this will occur with any frequency. As has been noted in other
contexts, disciplinary enforcement of lawyer litigation misconduct is
often a low priority for disciplinary authorities. 19 7 In fact, I have found
only one disciplinary case addressing the ethics of lawyer assistance in
the drafting of expert reports. 1 9 8 It has either seldom been raised or
196.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013); see also Call, supra

note 182, at 33.
197. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer Discipline:
An EmpiricalAnalysis Suggesting Institutional Choices in the Regulation ofLawyers, 37 LOY. L.A.

L. REv. 765, 765-66, 815 (2004). In this article Professor Joy discusses the interplay between
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and professional discipline. He found that although both treat
the same abuses, most Rule 11 cases never lead to public sanction in the disciplinary system. He
offers a number of explanations including, inter alia, that:

.

[L]awyer disciplinary agencies are unable or unwilling to control litigation
conduct; . .. the legal profession has determined that trial judges are more
effective in controlling litigation conduct in pending matters; [and] . .
prevailing standards for enforcing lawyer discipline and standards for
imposing lawyer sanctions downplay imposing public sanctions for litigation
conduct.

Id. at 807; see also id. at 809-10 (noting that "data supports the view that lawyer discipline is
primarily focused on client-centered issues; abusive litigation conduct, such as frivolous filings,
does not commonly trigger complaints leading to lawyer discipline").
198. The one disciplinary case I found addressing this matter is In re Donziger, 80 N.Y.S.3d
269 (App. Div. 2018). It should be noted that in that case ghostwriting the expert's report was part
of a litany ofmisconduct of which ghostwriting was only a small part. Id. at 269 (lawyer suspended
from practice for engaging in "judicial coercion, corruption of a court expert and ghostwriting of his
report, misrepresentations concerning the expert's independence, obstruction of justice, witness

tampering, improperly threatening criminal prosecution, and judicial bribery"). To the extent this
matter is analogous to lawyer ghostwriting ofpro se complaints, there are numerous ethics opinions
which split on when, if ever, the practice violates the ethics rules. See Basset, supra note 37, at 291-

93 (describing the split). There also are cases in which discipline was imposed for ghostwriting pro
se complaints, although often other more serious misconduct was also involved. See, e.g., Iowa
Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Rauch, 746 N.W.2d 262, 265 (Iowa 2008) (revoking
lawyer's license for numerous ethical violations including ghostwriting a pro se complaint); cf In re
Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 770-71 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (admonishing lawyer for engaging in ghostwriting ofpro se pleading but warning that suspension or disbarment from practice before the court
might be ordered in future cases now that the court's position on ghost-writing was made clear in
this opinion).
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publicly pursued in materials reported in easily accessed databases. In
the absence of clear guidance as to the line between proper and improper
conduct, it seems unfair to punish lawyers for their actions in
this context.19 9
It should also be noted that in none of the court cases I reviewed
concerning lawyer assistance in creating an expert's report did the court
sanction the attorney for this behavior, other than through exclusion of
evidence. 2" A verbal admonition is the most that appears in the cases.2 0 1
If the courts before which this behavior occurs do not more forcefully
sanction the lawyers involved, it seems improper to use license
restriction as the means to control this issue. That is not to say that
lawyer self-reflection is inappropriate here-lawyers should consider
whether the extent of their assistance seems professionally proper 202
but only that the norms are unlikely to be enforced through
disciplinary sanctions.
VI.

ALTERNATIVE CONTROLS ON EXCESSIVE LAWYER INVOLVEMENT

The present situation with its disagreement about how much lawyer
assistance is too much, or at least gives rise to credibility concerns, and
about how, if at all it can be inquired into, is untenable. Perhaps the
courts will come to some sort of consensus on these matters, but the
experience of the last eight years provides little hope in that regard.
There are, however, a number of alternative ways to help manage
these issues through amendments to the Federal Rules that do not
undermine the core concerns underlying the 2010 regime. 20 3 Robust
control of excessive attorney assistance in preparing expert reports can

199.

Cf In re Liu, 664 F.3d 367, 372-73 (2d Cir. 2011) (refusing to discipline attorney for

ghostwriting a client's complaint given that the court lacked any rule or precedent explicitly

governing attorney ghostwriting, some authorities nationally permit the practice, and there was an
absence of evidence that the attorney was attempting to mislead the tribunal).

200. But cf Indiana Ins. Co. v. Hussey Seating Co., 176 F.R.D. 291, 294-95 (S.D. Ind. 1997)
(where costs were assessed for mishandling the expert report, but the extent to which counsel's
criticized role in the report's drafting was the impetus for the sanctions is unclear).
201. KNAPP Logistics & Automation, Inc. v. R/X Automation Sols. Inc., No. 14-c-00319RBJ, 2015 WL 5608124, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2015); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 770-71
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2003).
202. Cf Wydick, supra note 58, at 27-28 (noting that the boundaries of proper witness
preparation are, for the most part, controlled by a "lawyer's own informed conscience"); see also

Arthur F. Greenbaum, JudicialReporting ofLawyer Misconduct, 77 UMKC L. REV. 537, 553-54
(2009) (noting that the underenforced duty to report rules for both lawyers and judges still spur selfreflection when considering whether to report).

203. Given the broad array of constituents that supported the 2010 expert discovery
amendments, see supra note 112, it is unlikely that they will be substantially changed.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

43

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 6

HOFSTRAL AWREVIEW

174

[Vol. 48:131

be achieved without devolving into excessive discovery battles or costly
in-camera review. 204
A.

Discovery Conference Consultation

One approach is to leave the question of the degree to which the
role of the lawyer can be explored to the parties. 20 5 Rule 26(f) could be
amended to make this a subject of discussion at the mandatory discovery
conference. 2 0 6If the parties cannot agree amongst themselves as to the
scope of permissible discovery on this topic, the court might assist
during a scheduling or pretrial conference. 20 7 The potential drawback to
this approach is that it allows the parties to deprive the trier of fact of
information that the trier might find relevant in assessing the expert's
testimony if, for example, the parties agreed not to allow inquiry about
the lawyers' roles in assisting in the expert reports. While information is
routinely withheld from the trier of fact by the lawyer's choices, as the
lawyer decides what evidence to put on and what line of questioning to
pursue, we might decide the inherent deception in presenting the expert
as a neutral, unsullied by the lawyer's involvement in the creation of the
expert testimony, goes too far.2 0 8

204. One concern expressed over approaches that require courts to determine if particular
documents should be discoverable once some level of need is established is that the in-camera
review process is costly and inefficient. See supra text accompanying notes 142-48; see, e.g., Stem

et al., supranote 18, at 329, 338-39, 356.
205. See, e.g., In re Cook Med.,Inc., IVC Filters Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1:14-ml-2570-RLY-TAB, 2018 WL 6113466, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2018) (enforcing party
agreement "that allows them each to withhold communications between counsel and expert

witnesses, even if Rule 26 permits the other side to discover them"); In re W. States Wholesale Nat.
Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 2:03-cv-01431-RCJ-PAL, 2017 WL 2991347, at *3 (D. Nev. July 12,
2017) (discussing stipulations and proposed order by the parties concerning expert discovery);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Keybank U.S.A., No. 1:01 CV 62, 2006 WL 543129, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3,
2006) (discussion of parties' agreement to share all drafts of expert reports); see also Gregory P.
Joseph, The Temptation to Depose Every Expert, LITIG., Winter 2014, at 38, 39 (suggesting that the
best course in this area of uncertainty is for the parties to reach an agreement limiting the scope of
discovery to providing the report and the expert for deposition; but author does not address the
scope of allowable questions at the deposition).
206. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3). Arguably, these issues are already the subject of
discussion since the Rule requires the parties to discuss "what changes should be made in the
limitations on discovery imposed under these rules or by local rule." Id. But, we are addressing an
area where those limitations are uncertain, so this provision may not apply. In any event, it would be

best to explicitly call this matter to the attention of the parties through a rule change.
207. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 16.
208. This, however, is probably not the case. Prior to the 2010 amendments to the Federal
Rules, parties routinely agreed to opt out of the extensive discovery of lawyer-expert
communication. See supratext accompanying note 116.
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Expert Report Disclosure

A second approach would be to add additional requirements to the
expert report rule itself requiring the expert to spell out the respective
roles the expert and lawyer played in the report's creation. This is
similar in policy to the present requirement that compensation
information be provided in the report.2 0 9
In numerous cases in which courts have expressed concern over the
comparative roles of the lawyer and the expert in preparing the expert's
testimony, courts have expressed that this can be controlled by
credibility determinations by the trier of fact2 10 as excessive lawyer
involvement can undercut the credibility afforded the expert and
her testimony.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already address one ground
on which the trier of fact might discount the weight of an expert's
testimony-financial bias. Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(vi) requires that the expert
include in her report "a statement of the compensation to be paid for the
study and testimony in the case." Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(i) allows discovery
of communications between counsel and the expert that "relate to
compensation for the expert's study or testimony." The rationale for
allowing this inquiry, which is not directly relevant to the substance of
the testimony, is "to permit full inquiry into such potential sources of
bias." 2 1 1While many expert reports simply provide the hourly rate being
paid to the expert,2 12 the rule is not so limited.2 1 3 It requires disclosure
of, and allows inquiry about, the "compensation to be paid for the
[expert's] study and testimony in the case." 2 14 Details such as the
number of hours spent are discoverable as well,2 1 5 unless there is some
fear that the discovery is being undertaken for an improper purpose.2 16
209. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(vi).
210. See supra Part I.B.
211. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment. See generally Michael
H. Graham, Impeaching the ProfessionalExpert Witness by a Showing of Financial Interest, 53

IND. L.J. 35, 41 (1977) (noting that impeachment on this ground is "universally recognized"); see
also Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and Compensation, 67 TENN. L. REV. 909,

940-47 (2000).
212. See, e.g., MANGRAVITIET AL., supra note 2, at 359 (noting in its examples that as little as
the hourly rate may be enough and quoting an expert-"It is sufficient to list the magnitude of your

flat fee or the hourly rate.").
213. See, e.g., Cary Oil Co. v. MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 751, 756 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (noting that "[w]hile most expert reports disclose the expert's hourly rate, the plain language
of the rule clearly refers to the expert's 'compensation,' which encompasses more information than

simply a billing rate").
214. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(vi), (b)(4)(C)(i).
215. See, e.g., Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm't, Inc., No. 07-6510, 2012 WL
12990384, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2012) (finding that "the parties must be apprised of the number
of hours that their opponent's expert witness has billed in order to gauge his financial interest in this
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Since the overinvolvement of lawyers similarly can undercut the
value of the expert's testimony, similar disclosure should be required.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) should be amended to require a statement of the hours
2 17
spent by the expert in conducting the study and resulting report,
including what the hours were spent on and a statement of the role
lawyers played in the process.2 1 8 While more intrusive, the rule could
require the expert to identify every sentence in the report that was
created by the lawyer rather than the expert.2 19
To accompany this rule change, courts should provide jury
instructions noting that lawyer involvement in helping prepare the
expert's testimony is not improper, but that it can be considered in
determining the weight to give the expert's testimony.2 2 0
C.

CertificationofConduct

A third approach would be to have the expert and/or the lawyer
certify that they played their proper roles. First, we would need to define
what the proper roles should be. For argument, let us adopt the role
definition most courts articulate allowing lawyer assistance so long as
the expert played a substantial role in the report's preparation. 22 1 Rule
26(a)(2)(b) could be amended to require that the expert include in the
report a statement that he played a substantial role in the report's
creation. 2 2 2Rule 26(g) could be amended to require that the lawyer
matter"); see also Ampersand Chowchilla Biomass, LLC v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 589, 591
(2018) (confirming this general principle, but allowing redaction of certain protected information).
216. See, e.g., Cary Oil, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (shaping scope of discovery about
compensation because of the court's concern "that such disclosure requests could be abused" in the
case before it).
217. Since this information may already be available as part of the compensation inquiry, an
amendment may not be necessary, but the rule would be stronger if the requirement were explicit
and the degree of detail defined.
218. In the ghost-writing context in which lawyers prepare pleadings for pro se litigants, at
least one court has allowed it as long as "the attorney signs the document and discloses thereon his
or her identity and the nature and extent of the assistance that he or she is providing to the tribunal
and to all parties to the litigation." FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Pichette, 116 A.3d 770, 784 (R.I.
2015).
219. CfIridex Corp. v. Synergetics, Inc., No. 4:05CV1916 CDP, 2007 WL 781254, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2007) (requiring a declaration from counsel as to the authorship of each set of
revisions).
220.

Cf ROBERT E. LARSEN, NAVIGATING THE FEDERAL TRIAL

§ 11:96

(2019) (discussing

jury instructions relating to expert compensation and the possible bias that may be inferred from that
fact). See generally Betty Layne DesPortes, Jury Instructions on Expert Testimony, in WILEY

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCI. at 1, 2 (Allen Jamieson &Andre Moenssens eds. 2009); David F.
Herr & Jason A. Lien, Judicial InstructionsRelating to Expert Testimony, SM060 A.L.I.-ABA 447,
451-55 (2007).
221. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
222. It should be noted that the advisory committee rejected a similar proposal during their

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol48/iss1/6

46

Greenbaum: Expert Witness Reports in Federal Civil Litigation: The Role of t

2019]

EXPERT WITNESS REPORTS IN FEDERAL CIVL LITIGATION

177

certify that the expert played a substantial role in any expert report
provided pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B).
There are, admittedly, some problems with this approach. Defining
exactly when the expert has played a substantial role in the report's
preparation may be hard to articulate, but the best practices standards
articulated previously could be a start.2 2 3 A second concern is that
certification requirements rely on the good faith of the certifiers. If all
discovery of the lawyer's role is curtailed in favor of this approach,
finding violators would, in most cases, be impossible. Nevertheless, we
often rely on actors proceeding in good faith in the litigation system.2 2 4
Finally, the substantial participation test was developed with the added
protection that more details could be learned on discovery and used for
impeachment. Here the impeachment protection is lost. Nevertheless, if
the predominate reason behind the 2010 amendments was to eliminate
virtually all inquiry into lawyer-expert communication, this would
provide some protection while honoring that desire.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Experts play a crucial role in modem civil litigation. They prepare
their testimony with input from the attorneys who hire them. Neither
proposition is remarkable. But beyond those two propositions, the world
of expert-attorney interaction becomes murkier.
At its core, we really have not decided on the proper role lawyers
should play in assisting experts in the creation of their expert reports and
ultimate testimony. Instead most courts have acquiesced in allowing
significant attorney involvement so long as the expert can be seen as
being substantially involved in the creation in her own report and
testimony. We largely leave it to the trier of fact to determine the degree
to which the lawyer's involvement undercuts the credibility of
the expert.
At the same time, we have limited the extent to which we can
discover the comparative roles of the expert and attorney, thus making it
harder for the trier of fact to evaluate the impact of their interactions.
work leading up to the 2010 discovery amendments. The question was whether to require experts to
certify that the report was "prepared by the witness." ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV RULES, AGENDA

BOOK 1, 13, Nov. 8-9, 2007, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr import/CV2007-11.pdf
That, however, was coupled with the thought that if the witness could not certify, the lawyer's draft
would become discoverable. My proposal does not go that far.
223. See supra Part V.C.
224. See Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices,
Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 SEDONA

CoNF. J. 1, 118-22 (2018) (endorsing the principle that discovery compliance lies, in the first
instance, with the disclosing party, without court or opposing party direction, and is enforced
through the Rule 26(g) certification process).
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Even with some limited direction from the Federal Rules about what
"communications" between counsel and the expert can be explored,
there is substantial disagreement over what kinds of questions may
properly be asked about the process of their interaction.
Within the current framework of the Federal Rules, one resolution
would be to abandon the inquiry. Let expert testimony stand or fall by
the extent to which the expert can support the opinions expressed.
Another would be to allow expansive discovery about the process so that
the trier of fact can have a global sense of the degree of lawyer
participation while protecting the substance of that input. The former
abandons a needed protection from lawyer overreaching. The latter
raises the specter of substantial discovery costs the 2010 amendments to
the Federal Rules attempt to avoid.
Given this, it may be time to try new approaches. Party negotiation
about the degree of discovery to be allowed, required disclosures about
the extent of lawyer involvement, or sworn certifications about the
lawyer's and the expert's role, all provide possible ways out of the
current morass while both limiting excessive lawyer involvement and
avoiding exorbitant discovery costs.
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